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Over the past decade, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
and states have developed environmental leadership programs (ELPs), a type
of voluntary environmental program designed to recognize facilities with
strong environmental performance records and encourage all facilities to
perform better. Proponents argue that ELPs overcome some of the limitations
of traditional environmental regulation by encouraging managers to address
the full gambit of environmental problems posed by their facilities, reducing the
costs of environmental regulation, easing adversarialism, and fostering positive
culture change. Although ELPs have been in place for much of the last decade
at the federal and state level, these programs have been subject to little
empirical evaluation. In this Article, we chart a course for assessing whether
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ELPs achieve their goals. Drawing on archival research and interviews with
government officials who manage these programs, we provide the first
comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of these programs, describing
program goals, activities, communication strategies, and data collection
practices. We find that EPA and many states have established ELPs to improve
the environment and to achieve various social goals such as improving
relationships between business and government. When it comes to collecting
data that could be used to assess these programs’ successes, however,
government efforts fall short. Even when agencies collect reliable data, these
data usually cannot be aggregated sensibly and are insufficient to draw
inferences about the true impact of these programs. They also cannot help
answer the question of whether ELPs are actually prompting pollution
reductions or improving regulatory relationships. These general data
weaknesses are significant, even surprising, given the aspirations for ELPs to
facilitate policy learning and advocates’ claims that these programs are
delivering important environmental benefits.
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INTRODUCTION

The rise of an extensive environmental regulatory system over the last
several decades has corresponded with a period of substantial improvement in
overall environmental quality in the United States.1 Increasingly, however, the
U.S. environmental regulatory system has elicited criticisms for a number of
purported failings. Some longstanding environmental problems targeted by
regulation continue to persist, such as smog, while new problems, such as
global climate change, raise growing, serious concerns.2 In addition, many
observers perceive that the current system is excessively costly, rigid, and
adversarial.3 Others argue that existing environmental policy fails to motivate
firms to find new ways to improve their environmental performance, and that it
provides too few incentives for innovations in resource consumption and endof-life product disposal that could yield substantial environmental benefits.4 As
a practical matter, the existing system may simply be too large to manage. For
example, nearly 400,000 facilities in the United States are subject to hazardous
waste permitting rules and more than 150,000 require air permits.5
In response to the limitations and challenges of traditional environmental
regulation, federal and state environmental agencies are experimenting with
voluntary programs as tools to achieve overarching environmental policy
goals.6 The term “voluntary program” encompasses a range of meanings. It can
1. J. CLARENCE DAVIES & JAN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES:
EVALUATING THE SYSTEM (1998).
2. Regulations to control ground-level ozone (or “smog”) have been in place for more than three
decades, yet in 2006 approximately 77 million people lived in areas where ozone levels exceed current
national ambient air quality standards. EPA, PUB. NO. EPA/600/R-07/045F, EPA’S 2008 REPORT ON
THE ENVIRONMENT 2-22 to 2-23(2008), available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?
deid=190806. Emissions of carbon dioxide, a primary gas contributing to global warming, have yet to be
controlled through national legislation; not surprisingly, CO2 emissions increased by 20 percent in the
period 1990 to 2005. Id. at 2-65. See also THE HEINZ CENTER, KEY FINDINGS FROM THE STATE OF THE
NATION’S ECOSYSTEMS 2008 1,3 (2008), available at http://heinzhome.heinzctrinfo.net/ecosystems/
2008report/pdf_files/Key_Findings_Fact_Sheet.pdf (detailing as key findings from the report’s section
on water quality that “contaminants were detected in virtually all streams” and in 80 percent of
freshwater fish tested; also noting that “one-third of U.S. native plant and animal species are at risk of
extinction”).
3. See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty & Marian R. Chertow, Thinking Ecologically: An Introduction, in
THINKING ECOLOGICALLY: THE NEXT GENERATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1–3 (Marian R.
Chertow & Daniel C. Esty eds., 1997); NEIL GUNNINGHAM, PETER GRABOWSKY, & DARREN SINCLAIR,
SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 6 (1998); Eric W. Orts, Reflexive
Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231 (1995); Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of
Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 21, 21 (2001).
4. See DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 81 (2006) (arguing that
traditional environmental regulation “[i]s [i]rrelevant to [m]any [p]roblems and [t]hus [i]neffective”).
5. EPA, Enforcement & Compliance History Online (ECHO), http://www.epa-echo.gov/
echo/compliance_report.html (select either “Must Have RCRA ID#” or “Must Have Air Permit” and
click “Search”) (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
6. See generally OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, REP. NO. 2007-P-00003, EVALUATION
REPORT: PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS MAY EXPAND EPA’S INFLUENCE (2006) (noting that voluntary
programs may increase the number of participants addressing environmental issues in ways that go
beyond regulatory compliance); FIORINO, supra note 4 (arguing in favor of voluntary programs as part
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mean private sector programs designed to improve environmental performance
beyond what regulations require or in areas not addressed by regulation at all.7
It can also refer to nonmandatory, government-sponsored initiatives seeking to
encourage facilities to go beyond compliance. At the federal level, the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has established dozens of voluntary
programs “designed to motivate people and organizations to take actions, not
required by regulation, that benefit the environment.”8
This Article reports findings from an empirical study of a certain kind of
voluntary program which EPA and states call environmental leadership
programs (ELPs).9 ELPs are voluntary partnerships between regulatory
agencies and private-sector facilities.10 The government sets the terms of these
partnerships, establishing specific criteria that facilities must meet to qualify for
membership in the partnership program. Businesses that are interested in

of a redesigned environmental policy approach); REALITY CHECK: THE NATURE AND PERFORMANCE OF
VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPE, AND JAPAN (Richard D.
Morgenstern & William A. Pizer eds., 2007).
7. See, e.g., ASEEM PRAKASH & MATTHEW POTOSKI, THE VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTALISTS:
GREEN CLUBS, ISO 14001, AND VOLUNTARY ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS 82–92 (2006) (describing
ISO 14001, the international environmental management system standard that is an example of a
privately initiated voluntary program). See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management-Based
Strategies: An Emerging Approach to Environmental Protection, in LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR:
MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 3, 13–14 (Cary
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006).
8. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, REP. NO. 2007-P-00041, EVALUATION REPORT:
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS COULD BENEFIT FROM INTERNAL POLICY CONTROLS AND A SYSTEMATIC
MANAGEMENT APPROACH 4 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2007/20070925-2007P-00041.pdf (quoting EPA, CHARTER FOR COORDINATING AND MANAGING EPA’S VOLUNTARY
PROGRAMS (2004)). These government initiatives fall into five general types: educational, financial
assistance, recognition, product certification, or partnerships. CARY COGLIANESE & JENNIFER NASH,
BEYOND COMPLIANCE: BUSINESS DECISION MAKING AND THE US EPA’S PERFORMANCE TRACK
PROGRAM 107 (2006) [hereinafter BEYOND COMPLIANCE].
9. See, e.g., Mark Stoughton & Elizabeth Levy, Voluntary Facility-level Sustainability
Performance Reporting: Current Status, Relationship to Organization-level Reporting, and Principles
for Progress, 21 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 266 n.5, 269 n.10 (2004) (giving examples of environmental
leadership programs, ways in which members participate, and benefits of participation); George B.
Wyeth, “Standard” and “Alternative” Environmental Protection: The Changing Role of Environmental
Agencies, 31 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 5, 41–43 (2006) (describing features of leadership
programs). These programs are also sometimes called performance-based environmental programs or
performance tracking programs. To the extent that these alternative terms connote that these programs
require businesses to achieve any specified level of environmental performance, they are a misnomer.
Even the label “leadership” could be misleading if taken to mean that members of these programs
necessarily have achieved levels of environmental performance superior to their industry peers. For our
purposes, we use the leadership label simply as a concise way to refer to programs exhibiting the kinds
of characteristics discussed in the text.
10. Government organizations also participate in many of these programs. For example, about 15
percent of the members of EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track are government facilities.
Private, not-for-profit organizations also participate: about 3.5 percent of EPA’s Performance Track
program report “research and education” as their primary activity. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC.,
MULTIPLE SECTOR ANALYSIS (unpublished spreadsheet, on file with authors). Due to the fact that most
members are business entities, for the ease of our readers we use terms such as “private-sector facilities”
and “businesses” to refer to the members of ELPs.
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participating in ELPs apply for membership, and the government, acting a bit
like a prestigious college’s admissions office, decides which businesses can
join the ELP and receive the benefits bestowed upon its members.11
ELPs share a common set of entry criteria and membership
requirements.12 To participate in most such programs, facilities must comply
with existing environmental regulations—but compliance alone is not
sufficient. ELPs call on facilities to set environmental performance targets that
go beyond regulatory requirements. They also call on facilities to make
commitments in areas that environmental regulations have not yet addressed,
such as energy use, water use, the quantity of solid waste generated, and habitat
loss. Businesses must report to agencies on a regular basis on their progress in
meeting their commitments, and in some cases they must share performance
information with surrounding communities as well. Most ELPs require
facilities to implement some form of environmental management system
(EMS), and some require that facilities receive external certification that their
EMSs meet prevailing standards.13 In return for meeting these requirements,
agencies recognize members and occasionally offer additional benefits, such as
regulatory flexibility or less frequent inspections.
EPA’s National Environmental Performance Track, established in 2000,
exemplifies the ELP approach.14 Over five hundred facilities belong to this
national program that “recognizes and rewards” businesses meeting specific
membership requirements established by the agency.15 Member facilities must
have a demonstrated record of complying with environmental laws, a
commitment to go beyond compliance with these laws, an independently
certified EMS, and a pattern of outreach to their local communities. In return,
EPA provides these facilities with positive publicity, opportunities for
networking with agency officials and business leaders, and certain types of
relief from regulatory and administrative burdens.16 Performance Track is
11. See FIORINO, supra note 4, at 137–138, 145–146, 171–73; PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7,
at 54–57, 62–67.
12. See infra Part II.B.–C. for more detailed descriptions of the criteria mentioned in this
paragraph.
13. See infra Part I.A. for a more extensive description of EMSs.
14. See, e.g., EPA, Nat’l Envtl. Performance Track, Basic Information, http://www.epa.gov/
performancetrack/about.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2008). For a more detailed description of
Performance Track, see Appendix I.
15. EPA, Nat’l Envtl. Performance Track, Members, https://yosemite.epa.gov/opei/ptrack.nsf/
faMembers?readform (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
16. For example, EPA deems Performance Track facilities to be a low priority for routine EPA
inspections. See Memorandum from Steven A. Herman, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enforcement &
Compliance Assurance, EPA & Richard T. Farrell, Assoc. Adm’r, Office of Policy, Econ. & Innovation,
EPA to EPA Adm’r et al. 3 (Jan. 19, 2001), available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/
downloads/PTComplianceEnforcement.pdf. In addition, Performance Track members that are largequantity generators of hazardous waste may accumulate such waste on-site for up to two times—and in
some cases even three times—the normally allowable time periods. EPA Standards Applicable to
Generators of Hazardous Waste, 40 C.F.R. § 262.34(a), (j)(1) (2006). See also EPA Standards for
Owners and Operators of Hazardous Waste Treatment, Storage, and Disposal Facilities, 40 C.F.R. §§
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hardly alone; over the last decade, twenty-two states have created programs that
share many of the same features as Performance Track.17 According to EPA,
“Performance Track and its state counterparts aim to transform the way that
government and industry address environmental issues and solve problems.”18
ELPs have won considerable support from government officials, business
leaders, and scholars.19 Former EPA Administrator Stephen Johnson declared
that Performance Track “has proven to be an important catalyst for helping
EPA change the way businesses look at their role in environmental protection”
and that it is “delivering impressive environmental results.”20 Harvard
University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government recognized both
Performance Track and the Wisconsin Green Tier program, a state-run ELP, as
264.15(b)(4), 264.174, 264.195(b)–(e), 264.1101(c)(4), 265.15(b)(4), 265.174, 265.195(a)–(d),
265.201(c)–(e), 265.1101(c)(4) (2006) (allowing Performance Track members to reduce inspection
frequencies from the normal daily or weekly schedule to a monthly schedule with respect to containers,
tank systems, containment buildings, and areas subject to spills).
17. Industrial Economics, Inc., provided us with a list of state ELPs currently in operation. The list
included basic information about each program including the program’s name, start date, and number of
members. For a description of each state program, see EPA, STATE PERFORMANCE-BASED PROGRAM
DIRECTORY (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/partners/StateProgramsDirectory
Final-May2007.pdf. Several of these state programs were actually established before EPA created its
Performance Track. FIORINO, supra note 4, at 172.
18. OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON., & INNOVATION, EPA, PUB NO. 100-R-07-004, PERFORMANCE
TRACK FIFTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 31 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/
downloads/PTPRreport_05final.pdf. Some states have sought increased support from EPA for their
programs. For example, a report prepared by representatives from several states asserted that “[e]fforts
are needed to align the EPA-state relationship to recognize and support performance-based programs
and to reduce transaction costs associated with program implementation.” ENVTL. COUNCIL OF THE
STATES, SURVEY OF STATE SUPPORT FOR PERFORMANCE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVED EFFECTIVENESS 7 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/
performancetrack/downloads/ECOS_Report_Final_01-13-05.pdf. EPA and states work closely to
implement their respective ELPs, exchanging information in monthly conference calls and, in some
cases, signing memoranda of understanding that document their intention to cooperate. EPA, Nat’l
Envtl. Performance Track, State Programs, http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/partners/linkage.htm
(last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
19. See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 4, at 149 (noting that recent EPA Administrators Whitman,
Leavitt, and Johnson have strongly endorsed Performance Track); EPA, WHAT MEMBERS HAVE TO SAY
ABOUT PERFORMANCE TRACK (2006), available at http://www.epa.gov/perftrac/downloads/
MemberTestimonials3_06.pdf (providing testimonials for Performance Track from over ten industry
representatives); Marc Allen Eisner, Corporate Environmentalism, Regulatory Reform, and Industry
Self-Regulation: Toward Genuine Regulatory Reinvention in the United States, 17 GOVERNANCE 145,
155 (2004) (noting that “if properly designed and implemented one would expect that this experiment
could produce some positive results” and could help “provide a context for innovations that could be
disseminated across the corporate economy”); Dennis D. Hirsch, Lean and Green? Environmental Law
and Policy and the Flexible Production Economy, 79 IND. L.J. 611, 646 (2004) (suggesting “that
Oregon’s performance track program is functioning as a bridge between the environmental regulatory
system and a new form of industrial production”); Alfred R. Light, Environmental Federalism in the
United States and the European Union: A Harmonic Convergence?, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 321, 341
(2002) (characterizing EPA’s Performance Track as “[a] symbol of the new ‘second generation’
approach” to environmental policy).
20. Stephen L. Johnson, EPA Adm’r, Remarks at the National Environmental Performance Track
Awards Dinner (May 9, 2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/
a883dc3da7094f97852572a00065d7d8/d38cc2f12730a7188525716c006f0388!OpenDocument.
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among the nation’s most noteworthy governmental innovations.21 Wisconsin
Governor Jim Doyle described his state’s Green Tier program as “essential to
demonstrating that environmental results and economic gains can be achieved
together.”22
Not all reviews of ELPs have been positive, however. Some
environmental advocacy organizations have opposed EPA and state plans to
expand ELPs, arguing that claims about these programs’ environmental
benefits have been exaggerated.23 EPA’s Inspector General has raised questions
about whether Performance Track is achieving its goals24 and members of
Congress have asked whether money spent on Performance Track might be
better used to support traditional regulatory programs.25

21. Press Release, EPA, Three EPA Programs Nominated for Government ‘Oscars’ (Mar. 30,
2006), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/68b5f2d54f3eefd28525701500517fbf/
09d2dfd224b8298f852571410059871a!OpenDocument; News Release, Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res.,
Wisconsin’s Green Tier Program finalist for Harvard Innovation Award 1 (May 4, 2006), available at
http://dnr.wi.gov/org/caer/cea/environmental/media/pressreleases/20060504pressrelease.pdf.
22. News Release, Wis. Dep’t of Natural Res., supra note 21, at 1.
23. In 2005, the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) submitted to EPA a fourteen-page
letter criticizing EPA’s and states’ “fixation” with developing incentives to boost facilities’ participation
in ELPs and satisfying self-serving agendas: “[T]here is scant attention and detail concerning actual
superior environmental performance—for example, verifying and quantifying the results under
programs to date; comparing those results to results under core environmental programs and evaluating
the trade-offs; and analyzing the roles of inspections, enforcement, audits, EMSs and innovations in
actually achieving superior performance. For all the talk of ‘performance’ based programs, there is
alarmingly little discussion and evidence of actual superior environmental performance or demonstrated
performance that goes beyond compliance.” Letter from John Walke, Clean Air Dir., Natural Res.
Defense Council, to Office of the Adm’r, Docket ID OA-2005-0003, EPA 1–2 (Nov. 3, 2005), available
at http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064800ad650&disposition=
attachment&contentType=pdf. In 2006, the Environmental Integrity Project issued a report charging that
some Performance Track members increased emissions of toxic pollutants after joining the program.
ENVTL. INTEGRITY PROJECT, WRONG TRACK? SOME PERFORMANCE TRACK FACILITIES REPORT
INCREASED LEVELS OF TOXIC POLLUTION 1 (2006), available at http://www.environmentalintegrity.org/
pubs/performance%20track%20report_feb06.pdf. The report concluded that “Performance Track offers
self-policing in its most extreme form, as participants get to pick their subjects, design their own tests,
grade themselves, and even change their report cards after the fact to avoid a failing grade.” Id. at 3.
24. In 2007, EPA’s Office of Inspector General (IG) “found that Performance Track did not have
clear plans that connected activities with its goals, and did not have performance measures that show if it
achieves anticipated results.” OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, REP. NO. 2007-P-00013, EVALUATION
REPORT: PERFORMANCE TRACK COULD IMPROVE PROGRAM DESIGN AND MANAGEMENT TO ENSURE
VALUE At a Glance (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2007/20070329-2007-P00013.pdf. In its response to the Inspector General’s report, EPA’s Office of Policy, Economics, and
Innovation noted that Performance Track encourages facilities to “aim high” and set goals “that present
a challenge.” Id. at 36. A purpose of the program is to encourage innovation, and Performance Track
program managers understand that meeting ambitious goals may not always be possible. The program
does now expect members to make progress toward achieving two or three of their goals to have their
memberships renewed. Id. at 30.
25. See Letter from the Hon. Albert R. Wynn, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Environment
and Hazardous Materials, and the Hon. Bart Stupak, Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, to the Hon. Stephen L. Johnson, Adm’r, EPA 2 (Apr. 13, 2007) (noting that legislators
“are concerned about taxpayer dollars being wisely used at a time when EPA’s core environmental and
public health programs, ones that are specifically authorized by Congress, are severely underfunded.”).
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ELPs have now matured into established programs. ELPs in seventeen
states have been in place for five years or more, and eight have recently or will
soon mark their ten-year anniversaries.26 Given that these programs have
achieved prominence as tools of environmental policy, formal evaluation and
analysis of their effectiveness is appropriate. The data ELPs have been
collecting about their members’ activities over the years might now be useful in
evaluating the extent to which these programs succeed in improving the United
States’ environmental protection system as well as for understanding how
government can communicate with the public regarding any successes these
programs have achieved. After all, one of the purported benefits of ELPs is that
they can enhance information available to regulators and the public.27
Despite their widespread adoption and relative longevity, ELPs have yet to
be subject to any formal empirical evaluation. To date, scholarly work has
mainly just described the design of a few of these programs or considered why
certain businesses participate in them.28 For example, one of the first academic
discussions of ELPs consisted of two state program case studies: Wisconsin’s
Environmental Cooperation Pilot Program (a predecessor to the state’s Green
Tier program) and Oregon’s Green Permits program.29 A subsequent study
summarized the features of ELPs in six additional states, raising questions
about these programs’ membership criteria.30 A related study considered
26. As noted supra note 17, we have relied primarily on a list of ELPs provided to us by Industrial
Economics, Inc., in identifying state programs.
27. See, e.g., David Monsma, Sustainable Development and the Global Economy: New Systems in
Environmental Management, 24 VT. L. REV. 1245 (2000) (“Measuring, reporting, and knowing the
environmental performance levels of an operation in near real-time is what the regulator and public want
and need to know. Overall, if a performance track is put in place, it would produce more complete and
accurate information . . . .”); FIORINO, supra note 4, at 148 (explaining that Performance Track’s “goal
is . . . to improve the ability of government and firms to measure performance”).
28. See, e.g., FIORINO, supra note 4, at 123–26; Stoughton & Levy, supra note 9, at 266 n.5, 269
n.10; 41–43; Wyeth, supra note 9, at 41–43; MARC ALLEN EISNER, GOVERNING THE ENVIRONMENT:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 177–96 (2007). The EPA’s IG conducted an
internal review of the federal Performance Track; this report, which could be considered an “evaluation”
in a certain sense, does not purport to meet the standards for a systematic empirical evaluation seeking to
identify the impacts the program has caused in environmental quality. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.,
supra note 24. The authors of this Article have also been studying empirically why businesses join
ELPs; however, even this work does not represent an evaluation of the impact of ELPs on firms’
environmental outputs or other performance metrics. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, EPA’s
National Environmental Performance Track: What Is It Tracking? What Role Is It Performing?,
(unpublished manuscript on file with the authors); Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Government
Clubs: Theory and Evidence from Voluntary Environmental Programs, in VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS: A
CLUB THEORY APPROACH (Matthew Potoski & Aseem Prakash eds., forthcoming 2008).
29. JERRY SPEIR, GREEN PERMITS AND COOPERATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: A REPORT
ON REGULATORY INNOVATION PROGRAMS IN OREGON AND WISCONSIN 5 (2000), available at
http://www.napawash.org/pc_economy_environment/epafile04.pdf. Both programs were created by state
statutes granting environmental regulators flexibility in issuing permits to program members. See id. at
7–8.
30. Jerry Speir, EMSs and Tiered Regulation: Getting the Deal Right, in REGULATING FROM THE
INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 198, 205–12 (Cary
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001). Speir’s review questioned whether EMS adoption was a
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reasons for the slow membership growth experienced by many state ELPs,
ultimately recommending that program designers pay greater attention to
defining environmental “leadership,” offering adequate incentives, and
establishing effective approaches to measurement and evaluation.31
No one has yet attempted, however, to use the information ELPs collect
about members’ environmental activities and accomplishments to evaluate
these programs formally. The National Research Council, EPA’s Office of
Inspector General, and academics32 have all called for careful review of the
role of voluntary environmental programs.33 To their credit, researchers have
produced a steadily growing number of studies on other types of voluntary
environmental programs—though not on environmental leadership programs.34

sufficient indicator of sound environmental performance to form the basis for a membership criterion in
state programs and argued that preferential treatment should instead be triggered by “a system of
information based on performance indicators” that states were “only beginning to build.” Id. at 217.
31. Michael Crow, Beyond Experiments, THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM, May–June 2000, at 20.
32. See, e.g., Kathryn Harrison, Talking with the Donkey: Cooperative Approaches to
Environmental Protection, 2 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 51 (1999); Daniel Press & Daniel A. Mazmanian, The
Greening of Industry: Combining Government Regulation and Voluntary Strategies, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Norman J. Vig &
Michael E. Kraft eds., 2006); Cary Coglianese & Lori D. Snyder Bennear, Program Evaluation of
Environmental Policies: Toward Evidence-Based Decision Making, in DECISION MAKING FOR THE
ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 246, 260 (Garry D. Brewer
& Paul C. Stern eds., 2005).
33. Comm. on the Human Dimensions of Global Change, Ctr. for Governance, Econ., & Int’l
Studies, Div. of Behavioral & Soc. Scis. & Educ., Nat’l Research Council, Decision-Relevant Science
for Evidence-Based Environmental Policy, in DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: SOCIAL AND
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PRIORITIES 85, 98–100 (Garry D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern eds., 2005);
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 6, at 1; EPA, EVALUATION REPORT: PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS
MAY EXPAND EPA’S INFLUENCE (Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 2007-P-00003, 2006);
EPA, VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS COULD BENEFIT FROM INTERNAL POLICY CONTROLS AND A SYSTEMATIC
MANAGEMENT APPROACH (Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 2007-P-00041, 2007).
34. See, e.g., Kathleen Segerson & Thomas J. Miceli, Voluntary Environmental Agreements:
Good or Bad News for Environmental Protection?, 36 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1998); Madhu
Khanna & Lisa A. Damon, EPA’s Voluntary 33/50 Program: Impact on Toxic Releases and Economic
Performance of Firms, 37 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1 (1999); Madhu Khanna, Non-Mandatory
Approaches to Environmental Protection, 15 J. ECON. SURVS. 291 (2001); ALFRED A. MARCUS,
DONALD A. GEFFEN, & KEN SEXTON, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LESSONS FROM
PROJECT XL (2002); Jennifer Nash, Tiered Environmental Regulation: Lessons from the StarTrack
Program, in INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INNOVATION IN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE (Theo de Bruijn & Vicki Norberg-Bohm eds., 2005); Matthew Potoski & Aseem
Prakash, Covenants with Weak Swords: ISO 14001 and Facilities’ Environmental Performance 24 J.
POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 745 (2005); Shanti Gamper-Rabindran, Did the EPA’s Voluntary Industrial
Toxics Program Reduce Emissions? A GIS Analysis of Distributional Impacts and By-Media Analysis of
Substitution, 52 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 391 (2006); Jason Scott Johnston, The Promise and Limits of
Voluntary Management-Based Regulatory Reform: An Analysis of EPA’s Strategic Goals Program, in
LEVERAGING THE PRIVATE SECTOR: MANAGEMENT-BASED STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE 167 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2006); Jorge Rivera,
Peter de Leon, & Charles Koerber, Is Greener Whiter Yet? The Sustainable Slopes Program After Five
Years, 34 POL’Y STUD. J. 195 (2006). For a detailed review of the literature on voluntary programs, see
JENNIFER NASH & TIM LARSON, PERFORMANCE-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS: LITERATURE
REVIEW (2007) (on file with authors).
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This gap is all the more surprising because ELPs appear to be rich with data.
Many ELPs require facilities to submit annual reports about their activities as a
condition of membership. EPA and several states use the data they collect to
showcase individual members’ accomplishments and to make statements about
the overall environmental benefits of the programs. Yet, to our knowledge,
neither government analysts nor academic researchers have sought to make use
of these data to assess systematically ELPs’ impacts on their objectives.
This Article makes a crucial step toward filling this gap by providing a
means for assessing whether environmental leadership programs achieve their
goals. Are they a positive force for change? Or do they instead represent
symbolic gestures that divert resources from more effective solutions to today’s
environmental problems? Drawing on archival research and interviews with
government officials who manage these programs, we provide the first
comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of Performance Track and the
seventeen oldest state environmental leadership programs.
After summarizing the primary benefits that policy makers and scholars
attribute to ELPs, our analysis proceeds in four parts. We first present
information about ELP goals. After all, ELP results should be evaluated in the
context of what these programs set out to do. Second, we consider the activities
required of facilities to join ELPs and remain members in good standing, as
well as activities undertaken by government under the auspices of ELPs. If
programs are effective, we would expect to see a clear, logical connection
between ELP goals and these activities. Third, we describe in detail how
agencies have communicated with the regulated community and the broader
public about their ELPs. Effective communication is especially important to
program success since facilities, elected officials, and community organizations
are unlikely to participate in, or support, programs with which they are
unfamiliar. Finally, we consider the information that agencies collect about
ELP results. Ideally, this information should be relevant to program goals, of
high quality, suitable for drawing conclusions about overall program
effectiveness, and publicly accessible. Such data are not only essential for
program evaluation, but also for meeting ELP proponents’ aspirations for
policy learning.35
Our analysis lays the foundation for any future evaluation of ELPs. We
encourage researchers to build on this foundation by undertaking full-fledged
evaluations of these programs. We highlight some of the challenges associated
with such evaluations, particularly with respect to data collection. As we will
show, despite ELPs various reporting requirements, agencies do not collect all
the information needed to determine whether ELPs are effective. This
shortcoming is particularly disappointing given that agencies have looked to
ELPs as vehicles for policy learning.
35. FIORINO, supra note 4, at 148–49, 163–65, 223 (emphasizing the important contributions
performance tracking programs can make to policy learning).
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BRINGING DATA TO BEAR ON ELPS’ POTENTIAL

In launching Performance Track in 2000, then-EPA Administrator Carol
Browner emphasized that the program “breaks with the past” approach to
environmental policy and “will bring cleaner, cheaper and smarter results.”36 A
growing number of supporters argue that ELPs, whether state or federal, can
overcome major limitations of the current regulatory approach to
environmental protection and forge the way to a new system of environmental
policy.37 As noted, the existing system is said to be too costly, inflexible, and
narrowly focused on controlling fewer, older environmental problems to the
detriment of addressing newer problems or larger ecosystem impacts.38 In this
Part, we begin by elaborating four benefits that policy makers and scholars
suggest ELPs may offer in terms of overcoming limitations of existing
environmental law. As compared to traditional state and federal environmental
programs, ELPs may allow agencies to address a wider array of environmental
problems, achieve environmental benefits at lower cost, reduce adversarialism,
and encourage positive culture change. After summarizing these potential
benefits, we then explain our research strategy for assessing the goals,
activities, communication practices, and information collection strategies of
eighteen of the most established ELPs.
A.

Potential Benefits of ELPs

Nearly all ELPs require or encourage facilities to implement
environmental management systems (EMSs). Given that EMSs are designed to
contribute to each of the four potential ELP benefits outlined above, their role
merits a detailed elaboration. EMSs constitute internal efforts by facility and
corporate level managers to set and meet environmental targets to address the
gamut of both regulated and unregulated environmental impacts caused by their
facilities Typically, EMSs adhere to what is commonly referred to as the “plando-check-act” model—where managers develop plans, assign responsibility for
implementing the plans, track progress, and adjust and improve the entire
system as necessary.39 In recent years, some managers have chosen to
implement EMSs that meet external standards such as those embodied in ISO
14001, a set of nongovernmental, international standards that specify generic

36. Carol M. Browner, EPA Adm’r, Remarks Delivered at the Performance Track Launch (June
26, 2000), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/d41dcc0e24d31638852572a00065
af98/9bfa2a1fa3765d998525701a0052e332!OpenDocument.
37. FIORINO, supra note 4, at 173 (“Performance tracking programs stretch the model of the old
regulation . . . . [They] are designed to change the regulatory system.”). See also sources cited supra
note 19.
38. See, e.g., Esty & Chertow, supra note 3, at 1–3; DAVIES & MAZUREK supra note 1, at 269–87.
39. See Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New
Policy Agenda, in REGULATING FROM THE INSIDE: CAN ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
ACHIEVE POLICY GOALS? 1, 2 (Cary Coglianese & Jennifer Nash eds., 2001).
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requirements for each of the four EMS elements.40 Some managers also hire
third party auditors to certify that their EMSs are consistent with the ISO 14001
standard.41
ELPs’ first purported benefit is their potential for spurring facilities to
address a broad range of pressing environmental problems, including those that
are currently subject to regulation (such as emissions of volatile organic
compounds) and those that are not (such as water and energy consumption). By
encouraging facilities to implement EMSs, ELPs may help set in motion
internal processes by which managers identify their businesses’ significant
environmental impacts, make commitments for reducing them, and monitor
progress toward achieving those commitments. Those processes of planning,
doing, checking, and acting are designed to endure beyond the tenure of any
one employee, becoming embedded in everyday routines even as personnel and
production processes change.42
Although ELPs have the potential to change the environmental
performance of facilities that sign up as members, these programs also may
strengthen environmental practices generally, even among facilities that do not
join. According to EPA, ELPs have the potential to “improve [environmental]
capabilities across the board,”—among not only “top performers” but also
“mainstreamers” and “laggards.”43 EPA calls this phenomenon “shifting the
curve toward better performance.”44 ELPs could shift the environmental
performance curve if “mainstreamers” or “laggards” tried to meet ELP entry
requirements to receive the benefits agencies bestow upon ELP members.
Today, many private sector managers seek to establish strong environmental
credentials to appeal to customers, improve their standing with regulators,
reduce risks, and attract investors.45 If facilities and agencies came to view ELP
entry criteria as norms for exemplary environmental performance, these

40. “ISO” is the common abbreviation for the International Organization for Standardization, a
transnational organization comprised of representatives from various private and public sector standardsetting organizations. See PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 83–84.
41. See PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 92–96. The number of U.S. facilities attaining ISO
14001 certification, as established by a registered third party, reached 5,585 by the end of December
2006. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, THE ISO SURVEY OF CERTIFICATIONS: 2006 9 (2007),
available at http://www.iso.org/iso/survey2006.pdf.
42. Coglianese & Nash, Environmental Management Systems and the New Policy Agenda, supra
note 39, at 1, 11–12.
43. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, AIMING FOR EXCELLENCE: ACTIONS TO ENCOURAGE
STEWARDSHIP AND ACCELERATE ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRESS, REPORT OF THE EPA INNOVATIONS
TASK FORCE 6 (1999), available at http://www.epa.gov/epainnov/pdf/report99.pdf.
44. Id. at 6.
45. FOREST L. REINHARDT, DOWN TO EARTH: APPLYING BUSINESS PRINCIPLES TO
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT 9–13 (2000).
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programs might influence the practices of even those firms that had no interest
in becoming members.46
ELPs’ second potential benefit is their ability to achieve environmental
gains at a lower cost than traditional regulation. Critics of the current regulatory
system accuse it of being grossly inefficient, requiring government to enforce
arbitrary, uniform rules that compel firms to invest in expensive technologies
and time-consuming paperwork, often contributing little to environmental
quality.47 ELPs seek to overcome the costliness of environmental regulation by
offering discrete forms of regulatory flexibility to participating businesses.48
Through ELPs, EPA and some of the states have taken steps to reduce the
paperwork burdens associated with regulatory compliance, to lessen the
probability that participating facilities will be subjected to government
inspections, and to enhance the flexibility of methods used to comply with
environmental performance requirements.49 In addition to lowering
bureaucratic costs, ELPs encourage businesses to pursue cost-saving strategies,
such as energy and water conservation.50
ELPs’ third purported benefit lies in their potential for overcoming the
adversarialism that many observers find too often surrounds traditional
environmental regulation.51 Instead of policies that pit businesses against
government, environmental groups, and local communities, ELPs seek to forge
46. See ANDREW J. HOFFMAN, FROM HERESY TO DOGMA: AN INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTALISM 40–41 (1997) (discussing how external pressures may shape a firm’s
internal norms and culture).
47. See Stewart, supra note 3, at 46.
48. Browner, supra note 36 (promising that “costs will be lower” and “administrative operations
will be streamlined” for businesses that join Performance Track).
49. See, e.g., EPA, MACT INCENTIVE FACT SHEET 1 (2005), available at http://www.epa.gov/
performancetrack/benefits/regadmin/mact_factsheet.pdf (describing some benefits to Performance Track
members including “low inspection priority, . . . regulatory and administrative flexibility,” and
incentives for “reporting reductions”); VA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, POLLUTION PREVENTION 2005
4–5 (2005), available at http://www.deq.virginia.gov/p2/pdf/report05.pdf (explaining the types of
“alternative compliance methods” available to certain program participants); Memorandum from John
Peter Suarez, Assistant Adm’r, Office of Enforcement & Compliance Assurance, EPA & Jessica L.
Furey, Assoc. Adm’r, Office of Policy, Econ., & Innovation, EPA, to EPA Reg’l Adm’rs et al. 2 (Oct.
29, 2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/benefits/oeca.pdf (reaffirming EPA’s
commitment to treat “Performance Track facilities . . . as a low priority for routine inspections”); Tex.
Comm’n on Envtl. Quality, Clean Texas Benefits, http://cleantexas.org/docs/CT%20benefits%
20summary.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008) (listing benefits to members such as “[r]educed reporting,”
“[r]educed state inspection frequency,” and “[e]xpedited . . . review of state permits”).
50. In many cases, performance commitments that managers choose as part of their ELP
memberships result in cost savings. For example, of the 1,170 commitments made by members of EPA’s
Performance Track program in 2005, 154 (13%) were to reduce water use, 187 (16%) were to reduce
energy use, 223 (19%) were to reduce non-hazardous waste generation, and 129 (11%) were to reduce
hazardous waste generation. OFFICE OF POLICY, ECON., & INNOVATION, supra note 18, at 9. In addition
to improving environmental quality, delivering on these commitments can save facilities money. Id. at
12–13.
51. See generally Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J. POL’Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991) (discussing adversarial qualities of the American legal system and their
costs).
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partnerships, foster cooperation, and build trust among these varied actors.52
Government regulators use ELPs to shift away from a predominantly punitive
role, offering carrots in addition to sticks.53 By fostering trust and cooperation,
ELPs also promise to expand possibilities for learning and creative problemsolving.54 In many ELPs, participating facilities disclose information about
their internal management practices, affording government the chance to
understand better the constraints and challenges businesses face.55 By building
a climate of openness, ELPs may foster the dissemination of ideas for solving
emerging environmental problems or implementing innovative business
practices.56 Through the requirement for EMSs, ELPs may encourage facility
managers to take responsibility for regulating the environmental impacts of
their operations and for reducing the perceived gulf between themselves and
regulators.57
ELPs may also stimulate improved relationships between business
facilities and their local communities. Some ELPs, like EPA’s Performance
Track, require facilities to develop processes to engage and share information
with local residents.58 To fulfill this requirement, Performance Track members
undertake a variety of activities such as hosting recycling drives, assisting local
wildlife protection organizations, and posting information about their facilities’
environmental progress at local government offices.59 Facilities involved in
ELPs may adopt more collaborative ways of interacting with their neighboring
communities, reducing costly conflicts and enhancing public trust.
Relatedly, ELPs’ fourth benefit may come from fostering positive cultural
change within both business and government. To the extent that the current
regulatory system fails to address the values and social structures that underlie
environmental degradation and inhibit lasting change,60 ELPs may better
stimulate cultural change by encouraging facility managers to interact more
frequently with those outside their organizations who may value environmental

52. FIORINO, supra note 4, at 136–37.
53. See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An
Introduction, in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1 (Lester M.
Salamon ed., 2002); John Braithwaite, Rewards and Regulation, 29 J.L.& SOC’Y 12, 12 (2002).
54. See FIORINO, supra note 4, at 223.
55. Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser, & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power:
Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 314 (2004).
56. See FIORINO, supra note 4, at 148.
57. Coglianese & Nash, supra note 39, at 1–2.
58. EPA, PUB NO. 240-B-05-003, PERFORMANCE TRACK PROGRAM GUIDE 7 (2005), available at
http://www.epeat.net/Docs/EPA_PT_Prog_guide.pdf.
59. EPA requires that facilities report on public outreach and public reporting activities in annual
performance reports to the agency. EPA, Nat’l Envtl. Performance Track, Annual Performance
Reporting, http://www.epa.gov/performancetrack/program/report.htm (last visited Sept. 12, 2008).
60. JOHN EHRENFELD, BEYOND SUSTAINABILITY: WHY AN ALL-CONSUMING CAMPAIGN TO
REDUCE UNSUSTAINABILITY FAILS 3–4 (2006), available at http://www.changethis.com/
25.03.BeyondSustain.

3 COGLIANESE

2008]

2/12/2009 11:51:12 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS

785

protection especially highly.61 Changing the organizational culture of facilities
could result in fundamental value shifts to the point where environmental
protection assumes greater importance alongside traditional business
objectives.62 These programs, in turn, could foster changes in those deeply
held, yet frequently unstated, assumptions in organizations and thereby shape
workers’ everyday tasks.63 Through a similar process, ELPs may help change
the culture of agencies by stimulating more innovative decision making and by
challenging their blind adherence to established routines that stand in the way
of learning and policy improvement.64
B.

Sample and Methods

In light of these four potential benefits, it is easy to understand why policy
makers and scholars have viewed ELPs so enthusiastically. Yet, to determine
whether ELPs actually deliver on some or all of their potential, government
decision makers need careful empirical evaluation. As a necessary step toward
such research, we have undertaken this study to assess the collection,
accessibility, and communication of evaluation-relevant data by the most wellestablished ELPs. In an important sense, our study seeks to evaluate the degree
to which ELPs have generated the necessary information to engage in the
“systematic lesson drawing” these programs are supposed to foster.65
Of the twenty-four ELPs currently in operation (one federal program and
twenty-three programs in twenty-two states), we examined EPA’s National
Environmental Performance Track as well as ELPs operating in the following
seventeen states: Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan,
Missouri, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin.66 As noted, we selected
these states because their ELPs had all been in place for five years or longer, a
reasonable length of time for a program to become established and begin to
attract members.67 Table A-1, presented in Appendix II at the end of this
61. Jennifer Nash & John Ehrenfeld, Codes of Environmental Management Practice: Assessing
Their Potential as a Tool for Change 22 ANN. REV. ENERGY & ENV’T 487, 524 (1997).
62. See John R. Ehrenfeld, Cultural Structure and the Challenge of Sustainability, in BETTER
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS: STRATEGIES FOR GOVERNMENTS, BUSINESSES, AND COMMUNITIES 223,
228–34 (Ken Sexton, Alfred A. Marcus, K. William Easter, & Timothy D. Burkhardt eds., 1998).
63. See Coglianese & Nash, supra note 39, at 11–12. See generally JENNIFER A. HOWARDGRENVILLE, CORPORATE CULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL PRACTICE: MAKING CHANGE AT A HIGHTECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURER (2007) (providing an in-depth account of how a facility’s culture affects
its environmental practices).
64. See FIORINO, supra note 4, at 172–73.
65. Id. at 163.
66. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC., BASIC INFORMATION ON PERFORMANCE-BASED PROGRAMS
(2007) (unpublished report, on file with authors).
67. Technically, Georgia’s and Wisconsin’s programs could have been considered as slightly
younger than five years at the time of our study since both programs began in their current form in 2004.
However, these programs were each based on earlier, similar programs that started prior to 2002. Given
their histories, we chose to include both these state programs in our study.
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Article, identifies and provides descriptive information about each of the
programs in our sample.
Many of the state programs have multiple “tiers” or levels of participation,
each with its own separate requirements and rewards. Where appropriate, we
used the tier as our unit of analysis, which meant that instead of just eighteen
programs, we actually collected and analyzed data on a total of forty-eight tiers.
Moreover, entirely independent from this study, analysts at Industrial
Economics, Inc. classified each tier in each program (or the entire program, if it
did not have tiers) into one of five categories: (1) Advocate, (2) On-Ramp, (3)
Middle, (4) Tracking, and (5) Stewardship.68 They based their classification on
requirements for membership, with On-Ramp tiers being the least demanding
on participating facilities and Stewardship tiers being the most demanding.
Programs in the Tracking and Stewardship categories shared characteristics
equivalent to or more demanding than the EPA’s Performance Track. Advocate
tiers—which simply recognize those who agree to be supportive of the ELP—
are qualitatively different from other tier types which recognize only those who
have met varying levels of membership requirements for environmental
management and compliance.69
Table A-2, found in Appendix II, lists each program’s tiers and their
corresponding category according to the Industrial Economics classification
schema. Later in this Article, we use these tier categories to construct three
subsamples for analysis: one subsample of all programs and tiers, one
subsample of programs and tiers in the top three categories (Middle, Tracking,
and Stewardship categories), and one subsample of programs and tiers in the
top two categories (Tracking and Stewardship categories).70
To begin our research, we gathered and reviewed publicly available
documents on each program in our sample, including material available on

68. INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC., supra note 66. What we refer to throughout this Article as
“tracking” programs Industrial Economics labels as “comparable to Performance Track.”
69. Our sample included two advocate tiers, one in Georgia and the other in Tennessee. Members
of Georgia’s advocate tier, known as “Champions,” include community organizations, environmental
organizations, professional associations, universities, and other organizations. Partnership for a
Sustainable Georgia: Program Levels and Criteria, http://www.p2ad.org/documents/pp_criteria.html
(last visited Sept. 20, 2008); Partnership for a Sustainable Georgia: Champion Criteria,
http://www.p2ad.org/files_pdf/ChampionCriteria.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). They are expected to
promote the state’s ELP by engaging in activities that encourage facilities to join. Id. Similarly,
members of Tennessee’s advocate tier, known as “Prospects,” include schools, households, businesses,
and other organizations. Tennessee Pollution Prevention Partnership (TP3) Members,
http://www.state.tn.us/environment/ea/tp3/tp3_members.shtml (last visited Sept. 20, 2008). An entity
may become a “Prospect” by sending a signup card to the program. Tennessee Pollution Prevention
Partnership, TP3 Criteria Overview 1, http://www.state.tn.us/environment/ea/pdf/tp3_criteria_
overview.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2008).
70. We initially examined only the first subsample (all programs and tiers). However, since ELPs
generally impose few if any requirements on advocate tier members and minimal requirements on onramp members, we added a second subsample that excludes these two tier categories. We also undertook
a separate analysis of the two most selective tier categories, as reflected in the third subsample.
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program websites.71 During September and October 2007, we collected the
following information:
•
program application forms and annual reporting templates
•
application and annual reporting instructions, if available
•
other program materials, such as descriptions of benefits, notices of
meetings organized by the program, and press releases
•
program legislation (for programs based on a specific authorizing
statute)
•
reports prepared on an annual basis by some state agencies and EPA
summarizing their program’s activities and impacts.
After completing our document review for each program and tier, we
contacted the key managers for all of the programs.72 Our telephone
conversations, although conducted in an unstructured format, each covered a
common set of topics: program goals, activities (including communications
strategies), and data collection.73 In asking about goals, we attempted to
determine the extent to which environmental and social goals both appeared
salient and motivated program activities.74 Interviews ranged in length from
twenty to eighty minutes, and we maintained detailed notes of responses. After
each interview, we coded the responses according to explicit criteria developed
as a research team. The information we collected offers a picture of what ELPs
set out to achieve, how they go about accomplishing their objectives, and how
they measure and communicate results.

71. One of us also participated in two workshops organized by EPA and held during the spring of
2007. The first, on May 8, 2007, in New Orleans, Louisiana, was held in conjunction with the National
Environmental Partnership Summit. The second, on June 18, 2007, in Madison, Wisconsin, was part of
the annual meeting of the Multi-State Working Group on Environmental Performance. At each
workshop, EPA asked participants to describe the goals of ELPs. Participants, who represented state
environmental agencies, private sector firms, EPA, environmental advocacy organizations, and private
consulting groups, offered a wide range of responses, including directly benefiting the environment,
improving the environmental performance of non-participants, and saving costs.
72. By program managers, we mean the agency staff members who are responsible for day-to-day
ELP operations. If more than one staff member was responsible for running the ELP, we attempted to
speak with the most senior member.
73. We conducted interviews on a “not for attribution” basis. In the sections of this Article where
we discuss interview results, we have removed factual details in order not to reveal the identities of the
people with whom we spoke. For this same reason we do not include quotations from EPA Performance
Track managers, since that program is sufficiently distinct that quotations could disclose interviewees’
identities.
74. For example, we would ask something like, “What are the goals of your program?” If the
interviewee did not mention any of the social goals that dominated the discussions at the EPA
workshops in New Orleans and Madison (and described supra in note 71), we asked follow up
questions, such as “Is improving multi-stakeholder relationships a goal?” and “Is changing the culture at
facilities and agencies a goal?” We coded responses so as to distinguish those given at the interviewee’s
initiative from those given in response to any of our follow-on prompts.
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FINDINGS FROM THE ELP STUDY

Each ELP offers at least a slightly different set of goals, activities,
communication strategies, and data collection practices. Until now, no
systematic evidence existed about what these programs have been designed to
accomplish, what they do, and what we can learn from the data they collect.
This Article is the first comprehensive analysis of all the established state and
federal ELPs, and it is the first to document what these programs in fact seek to
accomplish as reflected in their publications and their managers’ responses to
interview questions. To capture the richness of the variation in our data, we
organize our findings around six significant themes: program goals; activities
required to join; activities required to maintain membership; activities
undertaken by agencies; communication; and data collection. In this Part, we
present our findings. In Part III, we discuss several of their most important
implications.
A.

Program Goals

Program goals shape and reflect the priorities of ELPs. Our research
examined the extent to which improving environmental quality was an explicit
goal of the programs we studied and the extent to which ELP goals may extend
beyond delivering direct environmental benefits or striving to move the overall
environmental performance curve. We attempted to determine whether other
goals—specifically, improving relationships, changing culture at facilities and
agencies, and cost savings—showed up in program documents and were on the
minds of the program managers with whom we talked. While this second group
of goals, which we call “social goals,” might not lead to immediate
improvements in environmental performance, it could set the stage for more
profound environmental changes over time.
For each program in our study, we recorded whether the goal statements
found in program documents or that emerged in our conversations with
program managers fit into any of our five general categories: (1) direct
environmental benefits; (2) shifting the environmental performance curve;75 (3)
improving multi-stakeholder relationships;76 (4) changing business or agency
culture; and (5) cost-savings. Each program could, of course, have more than
one of these goals.

75. “Shifting the environmental performance curve” refers to the idea that ELPs might prompt an
incremental improvement in the environmental performance of all facilities. See supra notes 43–46 and
accompanying text.
76. In referring to “multi-stakeholder relationships,” we adhere to the usage common among our
respondents, according to which individuals and organizations affected by environmental management
and policy are characterized as “stakeholders.” Specifically, “multi-stakeholder relationships” refers to
relationships among businesses, government officials, environmental organizations, community groups,
and individuals.

3 COGLIANESE

2008]

2/12/2009 11:51:12 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS

789

Goal statements were usually straightforward and easy to categorize, but
at times determining whether a program shared the five general goals we
identified proved to be more difficult. To illustrate, one of our interview
respondents stated that the goal of his state’s program was “to reduce pollution
in the state and make everyone aware of their impact and create networks.”
This statement most clearly addresses the goal of improving environmental
quality, as it begins with the unambiguous phrase “to reduce pollution.” In
addition, the goal statement includes phrases that might suggest, albeit
indirectly and not as clearly, the goals of changing facility culture (by
increasing facilities’ awareness of their environmental impacts) and improving
multi-stakeholder relationships (by creating networks). As a general rule, if
program documents or a program official clearly identified one of the five goals
we outlined, we coded that clear goal as a program goal. Thus, in the example,
we concluded that the program definitely shared the goal of improving
environmental quality. When program statements indirectly or ambiguously
identified one the five goals we outlined, we coded it as a program goal only if
we found additional mention of that goal in another source. Thus, in the
example the goal statements “to make everyone aware of their impact” and
“create networks” were alone insufficient to conclude that the program shared
the goals of changing facility culture or improving multi-stakeholder
relationships. To conclude these latter goals were indeed attributable to the
program, we needed to find corroborating evidence in other program
documents and in our conversations with program managers.
Before the end of each interview, we specifically asked about any of the
five goals we outlined that were neither mentioned in the documentation nor by
the manager without prompting. For each goal we ultimately attributed to a
program, we kept a record of whether our supporting evidence for that goal
came from program documents, unprompted comments from the managers, or
comments prompted by a pointed question about a specific goal.
We also distinguished “goals” from “activities.” In many cases, program
statements would expressly identify as “goals” certain items that were more
properly considered activities or some other means of achieving a larger goal.
For example, one state program specified a goal of “provid[ing] pollution
prevention education and public recognition” to participants.77 Another
explicitly stated as a goal to “[p]rovide . . . regulatory incentives to member
facilities.”78 These kinds of statements specify a means to an end rather than an
end in itself and, accordingly, for coding purposes we considered them to be
evidence of activities, not goals.

77. Idaho GEMStars, http://www.idahogemstars.org/program/program.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2008).

78. DIV. OF ENVTL. QUALITY, MO. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., FACT SHEET ON MISSOURI
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP 1 (2006), available at http://dnr.missouri.gov/pubs/
pub2117.pdf.
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With this understanding of our coding in mind, Table A-3, in Appendix II,
and Figure 1, below, summarize our principal findings with respect to goals.
Our primary observations about program goals are as follows:
•
For each of the five goals we examined, no fewer than ten of the
eighteen programs in our sample shared that goal. Yet only the goal
of improving the environment was regularly cited in program
documents or mentioned by program officials without prompting.
Each of the other four goals was rarely cited in program documents
and typically came up in our conversations with program officials
only after we prompted them.
•
The most commonly cited goal was improving the environment.
Documents for all eighteen programs in our sample mentioned this
goal, and it also came up without prompting in almost every
conversation with program officials. The following are typical
responses we heard when we asked about program goals:
o “To encourage business to move beyond compliance to
becoming stewards of the environment.”
o “To recognize companies that are going above and beyond.”
o “To increase the number of facilities that have systems in
place to better manage their environmental impacts beyond
compliance.”
o “To encourage innovation that leads down the path to
achieving better environmental results.”
Figure 1. Typical Program Goals

•

The second most commonly cited goal in our sample of programs
was the social goal of changing facility and agency culture.
Although it was a goal for fourteen of the eighteen programs, it
appeared in only four of these programs’ documents and never came
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up in our conversations with program officials without prompting.
Typical was one program manager who did not mention the goal of
culture change until prompted—but then was emphatic that the
program was run independently from the state environmental agency
as a way of indicating that the program is not the “enemy” of
business.
Across our interviews, program managers conceptualized the goal of
“culture change” broadly. When prompted, some spoke of the
general relationship between business and government, rather than
the culture within a specific regulatory agency. For others, the term
evoked a discussion about how the ELP might change the culture
within member facilities.
The other goals we outlined—reducing costs at facilities and
agencies, improving multi-stakeholder relationships, and moving the
environmental performance curve—were infrequently cited in
program documents and were rarely emphasized by program
managers without prompting in our interviews. A majority of
program managers agreed that these were goals, however, once we
named them explicitly. For example, one program manager noted
that his program is “really about pollution prevention and
sustainability,” but responded that other goals, once we mentioned
them, are also “important parts of it.” When we asked specifically
about cost savings as a goal, another program manager said,
“Absolutely. Pollution prevention always has payback.” Yet another
answered, “[Cost savings] are not an explicit goal, but we do ask
[facilities to provide information] about that in their annual reports.
Some cost savings from alternative compliance are very significant.”
In contrast, one ELP manager said that cost savings was not a goal
since implementing an EMS “was not always cost effective.”
Another program manager felt that his program “can’t force these”
other goals and that culture change will only occur indirectly over
time as a byproduct of the program.
B.

Activities Required to Join

No matter what the goal, ELPs with fewer members inherently have a
smaller impact on environmental and social conditions, all other things being
equal. As such, a central challenge for government agencies is to set entry
criteria so that enough facilities participate to promote agency goals.79 Most
ELPs limit membership to facilities with certain characteristics. For example,
many programs restrict participation to facilities with strong compliance
histories. Many also require facilities to have implemented an EMS, or to have
79. PRAKASH & POTOSKI, supra note 7, at 54–57, 62–67.
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plans to do so. Programs we studied varied with respect to the stringency of
entry criteria—such as the number of years a facility had operated without a
compliance problem, or the level of sophistication of its EMS. For many states,
the mere existence of an EMS was not sufficient for entry; the facility had to
have established targets and objectives in line with agency priorities for
pollution prevention and continuous improvement.
Fourteen of the programs we studied had multiple tiers with varying levels
of entry stringency. For some tiers, programs limited membership to facilities
deemed to be top performers, while for other tiers less noteworthy facilities
were encouraged to participate as a means of encouraging them to undertake
significant beyond-compliance activities.
Just as we did to identify program goals, we reviewed program documents
and interviewed program managers to learn about the activities required for
facilities to join each program tier. Based on this information, we determined
whether facilities were required to engage in any of five common activities: (1)
compliance with environmental regulations; (2) implementation of an EMS; (3)
independent certification of the EMS; (4) specific environmental performance
commitments, and (5) specific commitments to community engagement.
Often the coding of these requirements, like the coding of goals, was
straightforward. At other times, however, coding required us to make judgment
calls as consistently as possible. For example, we coded “yes” for “compliance
with environmental regulations” even if a facility was allowed to have minor
noncompliance problems, or even if it could have more substantial compliance
problems if accompanied by a plan to resolve the issue. As long as program
documents or officials indicated that substantial compliance was expected, we
treated compliance as an activity required for membership in the tier. For
example, one state reviewed applicants’ compliance histories over a five-year
period to determine their eligibility, but it also emphasized that records “need
not be spotless” and did not specify the precise number or nature of compliance
problems that it allows. Another, in contrast, defined its compliance standard in
detail and took into account compliance issues at the corporate level as well as
at the facility. Both levels of compliance screening merited a “yes” designation
in our coding.
We also coded “yes” for implementation of an EMS as long as the
program tier required facilities to have an environmental plan that included the
“plan-do-check-act” system that is the hallmark of a traditional EMS.80 This
meant that we also coded “yes” in cases where a program tier stipulated that a
facility must have fully implemented an EMS before being accepted into the
tier, as well as in the case of a tier requiring adoption of an EMS within the
members’ first year in the program. On the other hand, we coded “no” for EMS
implementation when a program tier required a facility merely to have in place

80. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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an environmental policy and a plan for environmental improvement, since this
requirement did not call for all elements of the “plan-do-check-act” model.
Table 1. Activities Required to Join State and Federal ELPs

Activity Required
to Join

All Programs, All
Tiers
(48 tiers)

Middle, Tracking,
and Stewardship
Tiers
(35 tiers)

Tracking and
Stewardship Tiers
(13 tiers)

Compliance with
Regulations

85.4%

94.3%

100.0%

EMS

62.5%

77.1%

100.0%

37.5%

51.4%

84.6%

85.4%

91.4%

92.3%

41.7%

51.4%

84.6%

Independent EMS
Certification
Environmental
Performance
Commitments
Community
Engagement
Commitments

We analyzed the data for each of three subsamples based on tier types.
Table A-4, in Appendix II, shows our data and Table 1, above, displays our
results. Our primary observations about the activities required to join our
sample of ELPs are as follows:
•
A vast majority of program tiers (85 percent of all program tiers and
100 percent of program tiers in the highest two tier categories)
required potential members to be in compliance with environmental
regulations. As noted above, however, compliance did not always
have to be complete. Typically, minor episodes of noncompliance,
particularly when accompanied by plans to return to compliance,
were permissible. For example, one state program tier required a
“commitment to regulatory compliance,” which included a pledge to
resolve any outstanding compliance issues. Similarly, another
program required applicants to certify simply that they have “no
outstanding unresolved violations.”
•
A vast majority of all program tiers (85 percent) required potential
members to make environmental performance commitments.
Exceptions were rare; when they occurred, they were typically at the
lowest tier of a program. For example, to participate in one state’s
Advocate tier prospective members needed only to complete a form
with their name, contact information, and membership category
(school, household, or business) and send it to the state. Another
state’s initial tier was actually a reward for past environmental
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achievements and did not require any future commitments for
membership.
Most program tiers (62 percent of all program tiers and 100 percent
of program tiers in the highest two tier categories), required potential
members to have an EMS in place. EMS requirements varied,
however, from adoption of a recognized EMS standard such as ISO
14001 or the Responsible Care Management System, to development
of a nonstandard EMS tailored to the facility’s needs and resources.
Moreover, just over half of the programs and tiers that mandated
EMSs also required them to be independently certified.
A notable minority of all program tiers (42 percent) required
members to make community engagement commitments, such as
meeting regularly with local officials and community groups.
Program tiers in the highest tier categories were substantially more
likely to require these types of commitments.
Program tiers in higher tier categories were also more likely than
program tiers in lower categories to require prospective members to
have engaged in all of the five activities shown in Table A-4 and
Table 1. A majority of the program tiers in the highest three tier
categories, and no fewer than eleven of thirteen of the program tiers
in the top two tier categories, required all of the five activities. Note,
however, that in thirteen of the fifteen states in our sample with
tiered ELPs, the highest tiers had the fewest members.81
C.

Activities Required to Maintain Membership

Each of the ELPs we studied established requirements that facilities
needed to meet or maintain after being admitted. These requirements reveal
agency expectations for their facility partners. As above, we reviewed program
documents and interviewed program managers to learn about the activities
required for facilities to maintain membership in each program. Based on the
information we gathered, we determined whether member facilities were
required to engage in any of five common requirements to maintain
membership: (1) compliance (or continued compliance) with environmental
regulations; (2) continuation or development of an EMS; (3) reporting on
performance; (4) progress toward achieving any commitments made in the
facility’s application; and (5) community engagement.
As with our previous categories, some requirements for continued
membership were more clearly stated than others. As with entry requirements,
we coded “yes” for “compliance with environmental regulations” even if minor
episodes of noncompliance were permitted, as long as program documents or
officials stated that substantial compliance was required. In terms of “progress
81. The exceptions were Colorado and Maine.
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toward achieving commitments,” we coded “yes” only if program documents
or conversations with program officials indicated that progress was specifically
required.
Table 2. Activities Required to Maintain Membership in State Federal ELPs
Activity Required to
All Programs, Middle, Tracking, and
Tracking and
Maintain
All Tiers
Stewardship Tiers
Stewardship Tiers
Membership
(48 tiers)
(35 tiers)
(13 tiers)
Compliance with
75.6%
84.4%
91.7%
Regulations
Maintain or Develop
66.7%
75.0%
91.7%
EMS
Performance
92.9%
100.0%
100.0%
Reporting
Progress Toward
Achieving
32.9%
38.3%
41.7%
Commitments
Community
40.5%
46.9%
75.0%
Engagement
Note: Percentages are calculated excluding any activities determined to be “not
applicable,” as shown in Table A-5 in Appendix II.

We analyzed the data for each of three subsamples based on tier types.
Table A-5, in Appendix II, shows our data and Table 2, above, shows our
results. Our primary observations are as follows:
•
Performance reporting was almost universally required for continued
membership, but the form of this performance reporting varied. For
example, the primary way that members communicated their
progress in one state was through an email or a slide presentation at
the program’s biannual meetings. In another, members submitted
success stories. In still other states (as well as with the federal
Performance Track), members filled out detailed reports of their
pollution levels and community activities.
•
A vast majority of program tiers (76 percent of all program tiers and
92 percent of program tiers in the highest two tier categories)
required continued compliance with environmental regulations,
although, as noted above, minor episodes of noncompliance were
typically permissible. For example, one state program allowed a
member to experience a compliance problem as long as it promptly
disclosed it and developed a plan for correcting it. The manager of
another state program noted that a facility’s membership in the
program would be threatened if it had an “environmental black eye”
but not for less consequential instances of noncompliance.
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A minority of program tiers, even in the highest tier categories,
expected that members show progress toward achieving their
commitments.82 Many ELPs exhibited the view expressed in the
following statement from one program’s website: “[The program]
does not penalize a facility for lack of improvement as long as [it] is
making a good faith effort to improve performance and continues to
meet other program criteria (e.g. consistent record of compliance,
and EMS criteria specific to each tier).” Many ELPs required
facilities not showing any progress to explain why they were not.
Only one ELP manager told us that members categorically “must
make progress.”
Program tiers in higher tier categories were more likely to require all of
the five activities for continued membership, as shown in Table A-5 and Table
2. For example, four of the five activities were required by more than 75
percent of program tiers in the highest two categories, but only two of five
activities were required by more than 75 percent of all program tiers.
We should note that even in those cases in which ELPs ostensibly required
facilities to maintain compliance or demonstrate progress to remain members,
we were unable to determine whether ELP managers enforced these
requirements. We did not ask managers how they responded when confronted
with members failing to make progress or in noncompliance. We do know,
though, that managers of some ELPs (most notably EPA’s Performance Track)
do ask members to leave the program or deny requests for membership
renewal.83
D.

Activities Undertaken by Agencies

In addition to establishing tier entry requirements, screening members, and
ensuring that members continue to meet program requirements throughout their
tenure, government agencies themselves undertake a variety of activities under
the auspices of ELPs. We reviewed program documents and questioned
program managers to learn about these activities. Based on this information, we
determined whether agencies engaged in any of four common categories of
activities: (1) offering opportunities for members to interact with government

82. If program documents did not include specific language mandating progress, and if program
managers did not mention progress as a requirement for continued membership, we concluded that
progress was not necessary.
83. EPA’s fourth annual progress report notes that as of the end of 2005, the agency had asked
thirty-four facilities to leave Performance Track and had denied renewal to an additional fifteen. OFFICE
OF POLICY, ECON., & INNOVATION, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PUB. NO. 100 R 06 001, LEADING
CHANGE: PERFORMANCE TRACK FOURTH ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT 14 (2006), available at http://
epa.gov/performancetrack/downloads/PT_4th_Progress_Report.pdf. Reasons for removals or renewal
denials included “deficient EMSs” and “failing to submit Annual Performance Reports.” Id.
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officials, the community, and each other; (2) providing mentoring
opportunities; (3) providing incentives; and (4) sharing information.84
We coded “yes” for a broad variety of specific activities within each of the
four categories. We coded “yes” for “opportunities for members to interact”
even if an agency provided such opportunities infrequently or only for a subset
of members. For example, one state offered members the opportunity to meet
with environmental agency officials to discuss possible incentives but provided
few other chances for interacting. Some states, in contrast, emphasized formal
and informal meetings of members, potential members, and agency officials as
their programs’ most frequent and important activities. We coded “yes” for
“providing incentives” for a wide category of possible incentives, including
public recognition, the presentation of an award, and regulatory relief.
Likewise, we coded “yes” for “information sharing” if the notion of sharing
knowledge came up in program documents or in our conversations with
program officials, regardless of the means used to do so (for example, through
site visits or the distribution of literature).
Figure 2. Typical Program Activities

Table A-6, in Appendix II, and Figure 2, above, present our findings. Our
primary observations about the activities undertaken by agencies are as follows:
•
All eighteen programs offered incentives to members. Most program
tiers publicly recognized members as strong environmental
performers, sent them a certificate, and allowed them to use the
program’s logo. Some programs went further, providing discounts to
members on permit fees, extensions to the duration of permits, and
expedited permitting. Some provided a single point of contact within

84. Our cursory review of program descriptive materials revealed that these activities were
common to many ELPs, so we sought to determine their pervasiveness by further investigation.
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the agency to handle all of a member’s permits. Still others offered
“customized variances” in which their states granted flexibility with
respect to certain rules at a facility’s request (after careful
deliberation to determine that the request would not adversely affect
environmental quality), as well as reduced inspection frequency and
reduced reporting.
All but one program explicitly encouraged information sharing,
particularly in the areas of pollution prevention and EMS
development. Before facilities were admitted to one state’s program,
for example, program managers visited the site for an “opportunities
assessment” in which the agency suggested specific “best practices”
that would improve the plant’s environmental performance. All
members in another program were eligible for free technical
assistance. Many programs promised chances for “making contacts
and sharing successful project ideas,” as stated in one website.
Most programs (fifteen of eighteen programs, and possibly one
more85) provided opportunities for members to interact with
representatives of government, other firms, and the community,
although the degree to which agencies emphasized these
opportunities varied. One program manager told us that his program
facilitates numerous “incredibly dynamic” working sessions at
which companies share experiences about reducing their
environmental impacts. At one session, two members discovered
that one plant’s waste could be an input to the other’s manufacturing
process. “It [was] a marriage made in heaven,” said the program
manager. Another told us that networking sessions organized by his
program allowed facilities to “borrow wheels instead of inventing
them.” Successful sessions were not the rule, however. The manager
of another program told us that networking sessions “never really
took off” in her state due to lack of interest on the part of facilities.
A bare majority of programs offered mentoring activities in which
members helped prospective members improve their environmental
performance. Serving as a mentor was required of members in at
least two state program tiers.

E.

Communication

ELPs promoted communication in various ways. As noted above,
programs expected members to communicate performance information, and
agencies were engaged in various networking and recognition activities that

85. We received conflicting information from different sources about opportunities for interaction
in the Texas program.
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help foster learning and diffusion of information. All of the agencies in our
sample had developed websites that included basic information about the
programs, such as their purpose and major activities. In addition, some agencies
communicated with facilities through site visits and technical assistance. Others
organized annual meetings for members.
To learn about other methods of communication, we reviewed program
documents and interviewed program managers. Based on this information, we
determined whether programs engaged in each of several common methods of
communication: (1) publishing annual reports about the program on program
websites; (2) posting data on individual members on program websites; (3)
holding public meetings; and (4) issuing press releases.86
We were careful to distinguish between two types of information that
programs might post on their websites. We coded “yes” for “annual reports
about the program posted on website” as long as a program posted some sort of
regular report about aggregate trends among its members, even if its report was
incomplete. We coded “yes” for “information on individual members posted on
website” as long as a program posted some data about at least a subset of
members, even if the data posted did not include all the information submitted
by members to the program. For example, some programs posted facilities’
annual performance reports as well as reports on the programs’
accomplishments overall. For such programs, we coded “yes” for both
categories. Another program only posted facility reports, while still another
only posted a report for the entire program. We gave the former program a
“yes” for “information on individual members posted on website” and the latter
program a “yes” for “annual reports posted on website.”
Figure 3. Typical Methods of Communication

86. Our initial review of program descriptive materials revealed that these four communication
activities were common to many ELPs, so we sought in our further investigation to determine more
precisely how frequently they were used.
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Table A-7, in Appendix II, and Figure 3, above, present our findings. Our
primary observations about programs’ communication activities are as follows:
•
For our sample of programs, press releases were the most common
method used to communicate program results. Fourteen of eighteen
programs issued press releases. Some programs utilized the news
media for publicity more than others. Documents available for one
program noted that the news media had published more than fifty
stories about its activities, not including stories about individual
facilities joining the program. Another program manager worked
with the business editors of city newspapers to arrange for weekly
columns highlighting the program’s members.
•
A majority of programs (eleven of eighteen programs, and possibly
one more87) posted on their websites some information about
individual members. Only six programs (and possibly one more88)
posted annual program reports, however. One program manager told
us that she was not sure “what to do with” the information facility
managers submitted to her in their annual reports. “In most cases,
companies are doing their own showcasing all on their own,” she
said. “It’s difficult for us to make statements about program benefits
since everyone tracks things differently.”
F.

Data Collection

Data collection serves multiple purposes. Facilities that are required to
collect and submit data must establish internal procedures for measuring
progress toward beyond-compliance commitments. They must share
information with agencies and community groups they might otherwise ignore
or only communicate with in a more limited fashion. The information they
disclose provides a window into internal operations and commitments. Data
collected by ELPs serves other important purposes, including performance
measurement, communication of results, and program evaluation. We
specifically investigated the suitability of these data for evaluating program
effectiveness.
In our review, we assessed the data collected by our sample of programs
on five dimensions: (1) relevance; (2) quality; (3) aggregational value; (4)
inferential value; and (5) accessibility. Table 3 summarizes the criteria we used
to assess each dimension.

87. We received conflicting information from different sources about the availability of online
information in the Louisiana program.
88. We received conflicting information from different sources about the availability of annual
program reports for the Louisiana program.
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Table 3. Characteristics of Data for Evaluating Results of Environmental
Leadership Programs
Relevance

Do the data measure the stated goals of the program?
Best case: Data directly measure the goal or outcome.
Second-best case: Data measure some proxy of the goal or
outcome (a variable highly correlated with the goal or
outcome).

Quality

Are the data credible and reliable?
Program provides clear instructions for data collection and
reporting.
Facilities have an EMS (preferably third-party certified) that
helps to guide data collection.
Program includes a screening process for review of data
accuracy and completeness.
Program conducts site visits to verify data or EMS (or both).
One or more identifiable individuals certify the accuracy of the
data at each facility.

Aggregational Value

Can the data from individual facilities be aggregated?
Data are reported in standard units (quantitative or qualitative).
Data include normalization factors where appropriate.

Inferential Value

Can the data be used to draw broader conclusions about
the impact of the environmental program?
Longitudinal data are available:
•
Data on performance of participating facilities over
time.
•
Data on performance of participating facilities
before the program began.
Cross-sectional data on the performance of nonparticipants are
available:
•
Data specifically gathered by program.
•
Data not gathered by program but available through
other sources.

Accessibility

Are the data readily available for analysis by members of
the public?
Data are available to the public in a timely manner.
Complete and thorough data are available to the public.

We considered first whether data submitted by facilities and collected by
agencies were relevant to the stated goals of the program. Ideally, the data
directly captured progress toward the goals of the program. For example, when
a program’s goal was to improve the environmental performance of facilities,
information about such things as facility emissions and resource consumption
would be relevant. If a goal were to improve the relationship between
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businesses and the community, relevant data—whether qualitative or
quantitative—would focus on such things as public attitudes toward local
businesses.
We also considered data quality, that is, the degree to which data were
credible and reliable. High-quality data were collected in accordance with clear
instructions, and their quality and completeness were verified. Examples of
verification processes used by many programs included third-party EMS
verification, site visits, application advisory councils, and review by program
staff. Also, many programs required senior-level plant officials to sign off on
their facilities’ data, possibly lending further credibility to the submitted data.
To evaluate program effectiveness overall, data submitted by different facilities
need to be aggregated. As such, data will be most useful for evaluation (that is,
will have high aggregational value) when they are submitted in standard units
and include normalization factors.89 In our review, we noted whether
programs’ applications and annual reports required facilities to present
information in a standardized and normalized format.
We also considered the inferential value of the data, that is, whether they
could be used to draw broader conclusions about the impact of the program.90
For data to have inferential value, they need to be coupled with an
appropriately measured baseline for the purposes of comparison. One type of
baseline is temporal, that is, data collected before as well as after the
establishment of an ELP. Another type is comparative or cross-sectional, which
calls for the same data from a comparison group of facilities not participating in
or affected by the ELP. Information about the comparison group could
presumably be gathered by a program office within an agency (such as
information on toxic releases from EPA’s Toxics Release Inventory), or
obtained from other sources (such as information about energy usage from
utility companies).
Finally, we considered data accessibility. Only data that are accessible can
be used for evaluation. As such, we asked: Are data easily accessed by
members of the public in a timely manner? Is all collected information or only
select portions made available?

89. Absolute reductions in pollution are what ultimately matter for environmental and public
health protection. Normalized reductions matter only for purposes of determining program effectiveness.
For example, suppose overall pollution decreases. The only way to know whether a program caused the
decrease is to control for a number of factors, especially some measure of economic output. The
program might be effective if pollution per unit of economic output decreases. But it is almost certainly
not effective if pollution per unit of economic output increases, in which case any observed absolute
reduction in pollution is due to a decrease in output, not to the program. Similarly, suppose overall
pollution increases. If pollution per unit output decreases, then the overall pollution increase is probably
due to the increase in economic output. In other words, the program might actually be effective, just not
effective enough to overcome the growth in economic output.
90. See Coglianese & Bennear, supra note 32, at 253–55, for a discussion on the several
challenges of drawing causal inferences in the context of environmental innovation.
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As with other features, we reviewed program documents and interviewed
program managers to assess the relevance, quality, aggregational value,
inferential value, and availability of the data collected by our sample of state
programs. We looked separately at the data collected in support of each of the
five typical program goals outlined earlier in this Article for each tier of the
state programs. In each category, we assessed scores of “H” for high, “M” for
medium, and “L” for low based on the criteria shown in Table 3. If a particular
program tier did not collect any data in support of a given goal, we coded it as
“not applicable.”91
We analyzed the data for each of three subsamples based on tier types.
Tables A-8, A-9, and A-10, in Appendix II, show the scores we assigned to
each data characteristic, and Tables 4, 5, and 6, below, show aggregate
statistics for each of the subsamples. Our primary observations are as follows:
•
Programs collected more data to measure “direct environmental
benefits” than for any other goal. Almost 90 percent of all program
tiers, and 100 percent of the program tiers in the highest two tier
categories, collected at least some data that could be used to track
environmental benefits.
91. We assigned ratings of “H,” “M,” or “L” based on the following considerations. With respect
to relevance, a program or tier that gathered data that measured a goal or outcome directly earned a
rating of “H.” A program or tier that gathered data that measured a proxy of the goal or outcome earned
a rating of “M.” A program or tier that did not gather any relevant data earned a rating of “n/a” for not
applicable. With respect to quality, we took into account the following five considerations: (1) whether
the program offered clear instructions for data collection and reporting; (2) whether it required an EMS
that would presumably guide data collection; (3) whether the agency had established a screening process
for review of data accuracy and completeness; (4) whether the program conducted site visits to verify
data or the EMS; and (5) whether someone at the facility certified the accuracy of the data. For each
consideration, we gave each program or tier a “Yes” or “No” determination. When we assessed the
quality of data relevant to direct environmental benefits, we weighted each of these considerations
equally so that for each “Yes” the program or tier earned one point. A score of 0–1 became a rating of
“L,” a score of 2–3 became a rating of “M,” and a score of 4–5 became a rating of “H.” When we
assessed the quality of data relevant to improving stakeholder relationships and cost savings for
facilities and agencies, however, we determined that the first criterion—clear instructions for data
collection and reporting—should weigh more heavily than the others such that no program or tier that
offered little guidance for how facilities should collect or report these data could earn greater than a
rating of “M” for quality, and no program or tier that offered no guidance could earn greater than a
rating of “L.” We reasoned, for example, that programs or tiers that merely included a column on their
annual reporting form with the heading “cost savings,” without any information about how facilities
should calculate that number, would likely collect data that was neither reliable nor credible. With
respect to aggregational value, programs or tiers that reported data in standard units and using
normalizing factors earned a rating of “H.” Programs or tiers that reported either in standard units or
using normalizing factors earned a rating of “M.” Programs or tiers that used neither standard units nor
normalizing factors earned a rating of “L.” With respect to inferential value, a program that provided
both longitudinal data and cross-sectional data earned a rating of “H.” A program that provided some
longitudinal data, such as performance over time, or the possibility of some cross-sectional data, such as
compliance information for non-participants, earned a rating of “M.” A program that provided neither
longitudinal nor cross-sectional data earned a rating of “L.” With respect to accessibility, we considered
the degree to which a program or tier provided to the public data on individual members’ participation.
If it provided all available data, it earned a rating of “H”; if it only provided some data, it earned a rating
of “M”; if it provided no data, it earned a rating of “L.”
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The data collected to measure direct environmental benefits scored
“high” on relevance across all program tiers. The quality of these
data, however, was varied: more tiers scored “medium” or “low” on
data quality than scored “high.” As one manager noted, “People try
hard, but they turn in ‘junk information.’ They write down kilograms
but they mean liters. As a first step, I always do an ‘ocular analysis’
to flag things that just don’t make sense.” Another commented that
he had “no way of knowing” if the submitted information is correct.
“Mostly we take people’s word for it. This is a good faith program,”
he explained. Other program managers were trusting of the data they
received. One manager reported that he believes the data members
send to him because the members check the information internally
and certify its accuracy. Another manager believed that personal
relationships ensured the quality of information; he trusted the data
“100 percent” because his state is small and all the members knew
each other—and him.

Table 4. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of
“Direct Environmental Benefits”
Middle, Tracking,
Tracking and
and Stewardship
Stewardship
Score
Tiers
Tiers
(35 tiers)
(13 tiers)
High
89.6%
97.1%
100%
Data
Medium
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Relevance
Low
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
n/a
10.4%
2.9%
0.0%
High
41.7%
57.1%
84.6%
Medium
39.6%
37.1%
15.4%
Data Quality
Low
8.3%
2.9%
0.0%
n/a
10.4%
2.9%
0.0%
High
29.2%
34.3%
46.2%
Aggregational
Medium
20.8%
25.7%
30.8%
Value
Low
39.6%
37.1%
23.1%
n/a
10.4%
2.9%
0.0%
High
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Inferential
Medium
56.2%
71.4%
92.3%
Value
Low
33.3%
25.7%
7.7%
n/a
10.4%
2.9%
0.0%
High
20.8%
22.9%
30.8%
Data
Medium
31.2%
34.3%
30.8%
Accessibility
Low
37.5%
40.0%
38.5%
n/a
10.4%
2.9%
0.0%
Note: “High” is our top score in a category. “Low” is our bottom score in a category.
Percentages based on Table A-8 in Appendix II.
Data
Characteristic

All Programs,
All Tiers
(48 tiers)

3 COGLIANESE

2008]
•

•

2/12/2009 11:51:12 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS

805

The aggregational and inferential values of data measuring
environmental impacts were generally low, even for program tiers in
the highest tier categories. As shown in Table 4, less than one-third
of all program tiers, and less than one-half of program tiers in the
highest two tier categories, scored “high” on aggregational value.
The inferential value of the data was particularly low. No tier in any
category scored “high” on inferential value.92 In other words, even
when programs collected direct measures of environmental impacts,
these measures usually lacked some of the essential characteristics
needed to be able to use these data to draw conclusions about the
aggregate performance of members and the overall impact of the
programs. For example, one state program requires applicants to
provide detailed and relevant information, with documentation,
about their past achievements and future commitments, but it does
not require standardized units or normalization, nor does it follow up
with any requirement for annual reports that could provide data over
time. In some cases, improving data’s aggregational value by
requiring facilities to standardize and normalize information was
perceived to conflict with the desired style of a program. As noted in
one program’s annual report, “[t]radition might suggest a prescribed
format [for reporting by facilities], but that level of prescription is
what [our program] challenges us to minimize.”93
Many program tiers (exactly half of all program tiers and eleven of
thirteen of those in the highest two tier categories) collected some
measures of improvement in multi-stakeholder relationships.
Although the collected data averaged “medium” in quality, the data
cannot confidently be used to assess the impacts of the programs on
multi-stakeholder relationships. As shown in Table 5, no program
tier collected data that measured “high” on either aggregational or
inferential value. Moreover, far more tiers scored “low” than
“medium” on aggregational and inferential value for data on
stakeholder relationships, even those tiers in the highest two tier
categories.

92. Some program tiers did collect “baseline” data on each member’s performance when it first
joined the program. But even these data, while informative, have quite limited inferential value. To draw
confident inferences about the effects of programs, longitudinal data need to include information on
members’ performance well before they contemplated joining the program. Data over multiple years
prior to joining are needed to determine the trends in emissions over time, so as to be able to determine
if the program affected these preexisting trends. For a discussion of longitudinal analysis, see Cary
Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 UNI. ILL. L. REV. 1111–37 (2002).
93. WIS. DEP’T OF NATURAL RES., 2007 GREEN TIER BIENNIAL PROGRESS REPORT 16 (2007),
available at http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/caer/cea/environmental/reports/2007report.pdf.
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Table 5. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of
“Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships”

Data
Characteristic

Score

All Programs,
All Tiers
(48 tiers)

Middle, Tracking,
and Stewardship
Tiers
(35 tiers)

Tracking and
Stewardship
Tiers
(13 tiers)

High
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Medium
41.7%
45.7%
69.2%
Low
8.3%
8.6%
15.4%
n/a
50.0%
45.7%
15.4%
High
16.7%
22.9%
30.8%
Medium
20.8%
20.0%
46.2%
Data Quality
Low
12.5%
11.4%
7.7%
n/a
50.0%
45.7%
15.4%
High
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Aggregational
Medium
18.8%
20.0%
38.5%
Value
Low
31.2%
34.3%
46.2%
n/a
50.0%
45.7%
15.4%
High
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
Medium
4.2%
5.7%
15.4%
Inferential
Value
Low
45.8%
48.6%
69.2%
n/a
50.0%
45.7%
15.4%
High
18.8%
20.0%
30.8%
Data
Medium
14.6%
17.1%
30.8%
Accessibility
Low
16.7%
17.1%
23.1%
n/a
50.0%
45.7%
15.4%
Note: “High” is our top score in a category. “Low” is our bottom score in a category.
Percentages based on Table A-9 in Appendix II.
Data
Relevance

•

•

Almost half the program tiers collected highly relevant measures of
cost savings for facilities and agencies. These data, though, were
most often “low” in quality, and as with data collected to measure
multi-stakeholder relationships, they cannot confidently be used to
infer the overall cost savings provided by the programs. As shown in
Table 6, all the program tiers that collect data on cost savings score
“medium” on aggregational value, and most of them score “low” on
inferential value.
Only one program has collected data to measure progress toward the
goals of shifting the environmental performance curve and changing
the culture of facilities and agencies. In 2006, EPA surveyed
Performance Track members in an attempt to assess the program’s
impact on environmental performance, relationships with external
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stakeholders, and culture change.94 Other than this survey, no
program in our sample collected data to measure progress toward
these goals, even those programs that cited them as goals. We did
not include tables showing the characteristics of data collected in
support of these two goals, as they would have been completely full
of “not applicables.”
Table 6. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of “Cost
Savings for Facilities and Agencies”
All
Middle, Tracking,
Tracking and
Programs,
and Stewardship
Stewardship Tiers
Score
All Tiers
Tiers
(13 tiers)
(48 tiers)
(35 tiers)
High
47.90%
57.10%
46.20%
Data
Medium
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
Relevance
Low
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
n/a
52.10%
42.90%
53.80%
High
4.20%
5.70%
7.70%
Medium
12.50%
14.30%
7.70%
Data Quality
Low
31.20%
37.10%
30.80%
n/a
52.10%
42.90%
53.80%
High
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
Aggregational Medium
47.90%
57.10%
46.20%
Value
Low
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
n/a
52.10%
42.90%
53.80%
High
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
Inferential
Medium
8.30%
8.60%
7.70%
Value
Low
39.60%
48.60%
38.50%
n/a
52.10%
42.90%
53.80%
High
8.30%
8.60%
7.70%
Data
Medium
12.50%
14.30%
7.70%
Accessibility
Low
27.10%
34.30%
30.80%
n/a
52.10%
42.90%
53.80%
Note: “High” is our top score in a category. “Low” is our bottom score in a category.
Percentages based on Table A-10 in Appendix II.
Data
Characteristic

•

Making data accessible was a challenge for many programs. For
each of the three goals discussed above, a majority of tiers that
collected data scored “medium” or “low” on accessibility. Moreover,
at least as many program tiers scored “low” on data accessibility as

94. ABT ASSOCS., RESULTS OF THE 2006 PERFORMANCE TRACK MEMBERS SURVEY 15–23 (2007),
available at http://epa.gov/performancetrack/members/downloads/2006MembersSurveyReportFinal
062607.pdf.
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scored “medium.” The primary reason for these lower scores was
that most programs did not post facility applications and annual
performance reports on their websites, even though the documents
were generally available upon request. “Companies don’t want
others to see their environmental impacts and aspects,” one manager
explained. More commonly, programs posted online selected
information, aggregate statistics, or “success stories” that included
some data. For example, one state program posted narratives about
its members on its website but did not post the environmental
performance data that it collected through its members’ detailed
annual reports. Selected success stories can certainly provide a basis
for useful communication and diffusion of innovations, but for
evaluation purposes they are usually of little value because they are
not a representative sample of all the facilities affected by the
program.
We found that ELPs varied considerably in the amount and type of
information they collected. Some programs were information-rich, while others
gathered relatively little information about member activities. If the quantity
and type of information collected by these programs is central to their ability to
contribute to systemic policy learning, then clearly some programs are doing
better than others.
Of course, differences in information collection should not be taken to
suggest any judgment about the impact or value of the program in terms of
environmental protection or the achievement of what we have called ELPs’
social goals. We also recognize that the cost of collecting and analyzing data
that would meet the criteria we have outlined in Table 3 may be beyond the
highly constrained budgets that many states have given their ELPs. On average
the state programs in our sample only had about two staff members each—a
small number, suggesting that these programs have not been designed to collect
and analyze extensive data. Moreover, even though programs that collect large
amounts of high-quality data will be easier to evaluate, they are not necessarily
more effective in achieving their goals. Some programs with few resources
dedicated to data collection could still have significant impacts; such impacts
would just be immeasurable ones.
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SYSTEMATIC POLICY LEARNING

When considered in the aggregate, our findings provide insight into larger
questions about ELPs’ structure and evaluation. In this Part, we draw upon our
findings to discuss three issues: variation among programs, the match between
program activities and goals, and the role and use of data in learning from and
about ELPs.
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Variations among Programs

Our principal findings reveal significant variation in the range of goals,
activities, methods of communication, and data collection undertaken by ELPs.
Although EPA and scholars have treated these programs as belonging to a
single category of policy instruments, in reality ELPs are a diverse collection of
programs.
The greatest similarities can be found in EPA’s Performance Track and
the highest tier programs in states such as Georgia, Tennessee, Texas, and
Virginia. Performance Track exhibits all the characteristics we coded for and
collects data that generally score between “high” and “medium” on our criteria.
The highest tiers in Georgia’s “Partnership for a Sustainable Georgia” and in
Texas’s “Clean Texas” program pursued all five of the goals, required nine of
ten requirements for joining and staying in the program, engaged in four of five
of the coded agency activities and two or three methods of communication, and
gathered data that generally scored between “high” and “medium” on our
criteria. The highest tiers of Tennessee’s “Pollution Prevention Partnership”
program and Virginia’s “Environmental Excellence Program” shared a similar
number of characteristics as the programs in Texas and Georgia and gathered
data that averaged “medium” according to our criteria.
Other programs, on the other hand, only scored high in specific categories
of coded characteristics. For example, six other programs shared four or five of
the hypothesized goals; the highest tiers of eight programs required four or five
of the common activities for joining the program; and the highest tiers of a
similar but not identical set of six programs collected data that averaged at least
“medium” on our criteria. These other programs did not, however, match our
criteria across the board as completely as Performance Track and the highest
tiers of the Georgia, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia programs.
Moreover, a number of the state programs, even at their highest tiers,
displayed less than half of the characteristics we examined.95 This is perhaps
not surprising, since some of these programs, such as New Mexico’s “Green
Zia Environmental Excellence Recognition Program,” were found to be just
one-time award programs that largely recognized past environmental
achievements and collected limited data to document them. Others, such as
Idaho’s “GEMStars” program and Louisiana’s “Environmental Leadership
Program,” were found to be ongoing membership programs that shared a few
of the characteristics in each of our categories and collected data that met a few
of our criteria—but were not very expansive in scope or in their activities
compared to other programs.

95. In other words, for some states the most stringent tiers were akin to what we have called
“Middle” tiers for other states. For example, in Idaho and Louisiana, the highest tiers were comparable
to “Middle” tiers. New Mexico’s most stringent tier ranked as “Tracking,” but its design was
substantially different from other ELPs.
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It is critical to reiterate that our findings in this study, and particularly the
summaries in the paragraphs above, do not speak to how effectively the
programs achieve their goals. It is entirely possible that the programs that met
most of our coded characteristics and collected data that scored well on our
criteria have not met their objectives as well as other programs. We simply
cannot say. Our analysis has been intended to provide insight into the structure
and operation of ELPs and the characteristics of the data they collect, all as a
prelude to systematic program evaluation research. One implication of our
study for future research on ELPs is that researchers should take into account
the variation in the programs. Researchers can and should assess how the
differences we have documented might influence these programs’ effectiveness
in terms of achieving environmental and social goals.
B.

Mapping Activities to Goals

Another way our study could be used to inform future research on
program effectiveness is by linking program activities to program goals. To be
effective, a program must presumably design its activities to support its stated
goals. In this study, we did not assess the effectiveness of program activities
nor did we empirically investigate the links between activities and goals.
Nonetheless, we can pose a series of suppositions as to how program activities
and goals are currently linked.
For example, the activities most connected with the goal of providing
direct environmental benefits might presumably be having members make
environmental performance commitments and then make progress toward
achieving them. Most program tiers (over 85 percent overall) required
environmental performance commitments. But far fewer tiers (less than 33
percent overall and less than 42 percent of tiers in the highest two tier
categories) mandated that members show progress toward meeting all those
commitments. Thus, even though it would seem that the initial membership
requirements of many programs connected well with the goal of improving
environmental quality, the activities required to maintain membership in these
programs frequently did not seem to connect as well. Surprisingly, in a
substantial number of state programs, facilities may have remained members in
good standing while achieving little or no progress toward commitments they
had made.96

96. Some program officials may view the required commitments as spurs for improvement, rather
than binding ends themselves. In other words, programs could be designed to allow firms to make
“stretch goals” that are hard to attain, if doing so would encourage firms to make good faith efforts to
improve their environmental performance beyond what they would otherwise have done, even if those
improvements fail to meet firms’ stated goals. Of course, if government officials do not expect any or
much progress toward firms’ commitments to remain in ELPs, it is hard to see how over the long term
the process of making commitments—attainable or otherwise—would provide much incentive for firms
to engage in costly efforts to improve their environmental performance significantly.
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The goal of improving multi-stakeholder relationships may be advanced
when ELPs require members to engage the community as well as when they
provide regular opportunities for members to interact with government officials
and other companies.97 Relatively few program tiers (less than 42 percent
overall but far more at the higher tier categories) required potential members to
establish community engagement goals or commitments, and even fewer (less
than 41 percent overall and 75 percent in the highest two tier categories)
required members to engage the community to maintain membership. On the
other hand, most programs (at least fifteen of eighteen) provided opportunities
for interaction among stakeholders.
A government activity closely connected with the goal of shifting the
environmental performance curve might be the provision of mentorship
opportunities.98 Over half of the programs in our sample provided such
opportunities. Another program feature that might help shift the performance
curve could be the establishment of several different membership tiers.
Fourteen state programs in our sample had more than one tier, but EPA’s
Performance Track and three state programs in our sample did not. The
existence of multiple tiers may encourage facilities that would like to improve,
even though they might not yet have the resources or expertise to show a high
level of achievement.99
An activity quite plausibly connected with the goal of changing the culture
at facilities is the implementation of an EMS. Almost two-thirds of all program
tiers and all tiers in the highest two tier categories required facilities to have an
EMS to join the program and to maintain or develop an EMS as a condition for
continued membership. Thus, program requirements for some but not all
programs could plausibly be said to support the goal of changing facility
culture.
An activity connected with the goal of reducing costs for facilities and
agencies might be providing incentives of regulatory flexibility to members.

97. When a facility sponsors a community recycling drive or shares information about its
environmental performance with community groups, the assumption is that this will lead to increased
trust and cooperation between the facility and the community. Of course, it is also possible that the
reverse could occur. Jonathan C. Borck, Cary Coglianese, & Jennifer Nash, Evaluating the Social
Effects of Performance-Based Environmental Programs, 38 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,697, 10,698–99 (2008).
98. For a discussion of shifting the performance curve, see supra notes 43-46 and accompanying
text.
99. Of course, this does not mean that establishing multiple tiers is always easy for government to
do. When it launched Performance Track, EPA initially planned to implement both an Achievement
Track and a more rigorous Stewardship Track. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FIRST PHASE PUBLIC
MEETINGS ON THE DESIGN OF THE STEWARDSHIP TRACK 1–2 (n.d.) (unpublished summary of
discussions held in the fall of 2000 in Washington, D.C., San Francisco, and Chicago, on file with
authors). In the rush to get the program running, EPA postponed development of the Stewardship Track
and admitted its first members to the Achievement Track. EPA had trouble articulating what additional
requirements should be imposed on Stewardship Track members, so it later abandoned plans for a more
demanding tier. EPA’s history demonstrates a key challenge of multiple-tiered programs: defining
criteria for entry and ongoing membership that are unambiguous and encourage participation.
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Although all programs provided some incentives to members, such as
recognition, only some of the program tiers offered specific forms of regulatory
flexibility, where cost savings could presumably be achieved.
These observations suggest that notwithstanding the various goals
attributed to them, ELPs have not been consistently designed to achieve all of
these goals. To be sure, our postulations about the connections between
different activities and different goals are by no means complete or definitive.
However, they do show how our empirical findings about activities and goals
can point the way for future analysis and program evaluation.100 Such an
evaluation might test whether activities do in fact contribute to program goals,
through collection and analysis of appropriate data.
C.

Data Collection

Finally, a central purpose of our study has been to assess the
characteristics of the data programs collect from their members. As discussed
in Part II.F., we observed that most of the data collected pertain to facilities’
environmental performance. While we have found that these indicators are
usually of reasonable quality and trustworthiness, program and participant data
are simply not scrutinized or audited very closely in a number of states.101
Moreover, due to limitations in aggregational and inferential value, these data
cannot generally be used to draw inferences about program efficacy.
Nonetheless, the data being collected may be useful in a number of other
ways. For example, program managers and independent analysts can use these
data simply to characterize what member facilities are doing. Government can
publicize individual facilities’ data in raw form to highlight good (or bad)
cases. In many programs, such as EPA’s Performance Track, officials can
aggregate the data at the program level to describe the collective environmental
performance of members. When environmental data from multiple years are
available—and often they are—they can show trends in the performance of
members over time. Even if the data cannot show that the programs themselves
caused these trends (because of the absence of a control group of
nonparticipants against which to measure the trends), the data can nevertheless
suggest potential changes.
If governments want ELPs to gather data that could be used to assess
program effectiveness over time, they would do well to seek to collect data that
share all of the characteristics identified in Table 3. Data collection and
reporting requirements should be designed to maximize relevance, quality,
aggregational value, and inferential value. When it comes to environmental
performance indicators, where most programs currently fall short is in ensuring
100. Such evaluation might begin with the development of a logic model that traces the connection
between program goals, activities, and outcomes. See EPA, GUIDELINES FOR MEASURING THE
PERFORMANCE OF EPA PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 8–11 (2006) (on file with authors).
101. See supra Part II.F and Tables 11–16.
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the aggregational and inferential value of the data. Meeting these criteria may
require mandating standard units and normalization factors as well as collecting
data over time for both member facilities and, crucially, similar nonmember
facilities.
To measure progress toward social goals, ELPs have much more to do.
Measuring improvements in multi-stakeholder relationships and changes in
facility and agency culture requires defining and identifying relevant variables
that measure the goals as closely as possible (a challenging task in itself), and
then collecting quantitative or qualitative measures for these variables from
member and nonmember facilities over time.102 The task may be difficult but it
should not be impossible. Its completion is necessary to permit analysts to
judge, with any degree of confidence, the effectiveness of these ELPs in terms
of their social goals.
To be sure, whether any particular program should engage in this data
collection effort is another question entirely. It is true that program
effectiveness cannot be determined without such an effort. But collecting the
requisite data, particularly for the social goals, will likely be costly and time
consuming. It may impose burdens on program members that could discourage
participation in what are, after all, voluntary programs.103 Moreover, the
conclusions from the resulting analysis may not end up being valuable or useful
enough in terms of what agencies or the public would actually do with that
information. Information collection has its own costs, and these costs may well
not be justified in some cases, especially if the data will go unanalyzed or
ignored. In this Article, we have indicated what needs to be done to determine
better the effectiveness of ELPs, but the research we have undertaken cannot
ultimately tell us whether it should be done.
CONCLUSION

Over the past decade, EPA and states have developed ELPs to address an
array of environmental and social goals. Although many of these programs
have been in place for five years or longer, little systematic research exists
about their goals, operations, communications, and data collection practices.
This Article, based on a review of program materials and interviews with key
program managers, provides a descriptive account of the EPA’s Performance
Track Program and the most longstanding ELPs in seventeen states.
While improving environmental quality stands out as the most important
goal of ELPs, a majority of the programs we studied reflected interest in
achieving broader environmental and social goals as well. For ten of the
eighteen programs, we found support for the goals of shifting the
environmental performance curve, reducing costs, improving relationships, and

102. Borck, Coglianese, & Nash, supra note 97, at 10,699–701.
103. BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 8, at 7.

3 COGLIANESE

814

2/12/2009 11:51:12 AM

ECOLOGY LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 35:771

changing culture at facilities and agencies. Although a majority of programs
shared these broader goals, they were clearly secondary goals. Program
documents infrequently mentioned them, and program officials rarely identified
them as goals until we asked explicitly about them.
Most program tiers required potential members to comply with
environmental regulations, to have an EMS in place, and to set environmental
performance goals. But those requirements were not maximally stringent.
Typically, programs permitted minor episodes of noncompliance, and only a
minority of programs required potential members to certify their EMSs through
an independent audit. A few tiers, including some in the highest categories, did
not require compliance with environmental regulations for continued
membership. Moreover, a majority of program tiers, even at the highest levels,
did not explicitly require that members demonstrate progress toward their
commitments.
Unlike members’ activities, programs were more uniform in the types of
activities undertaken by the program staff themselves. All programs provided
some type of incentive to members, and almost all programs facilitated
information sharing and provided opportunities for members to interact with
program officials and other stakeholders.
Programs used various methods of communication and sometimes made
facility performance data available to the public. A majority of programs issued
press releases about members and posted at least some information about
members on program websites. EPA and five states posted members’
applications and annual performance reports on their websites, and about onethird published annual reports about the overall impact of their programs.
We found that most program tiers in our sample collected highly relevant
data to track the goal of improving the environment, and about half of the
program tiers collected somewhat relevant data to track the goal of improving
multi-stakeholder relationships and highly relevant data to track the goal of
reducing costs for facilities and agencies. But, with the exception of EPA’s
Performance Track, no programs collected data to measure the goals of
changing facility and agency culture or of moving the environmental
performance curve, even though both were identified as important goals by
officials from a majority of the programs. In other words, the collection of
environmental performance data was common, but the collection of measures
of other stated goals of ELPs was infrequent or entirely nonexistent.
Our study assessed several important characteristics of the data collected
by programs to track progress toward their goals: the quality of the data, the
aggregational value of the data, and the inferential value of the data. We used a
simple but comprehensive rubric to assign a score of “high,” “medium,” or
“low” on each characteristic to the data collected in support of each program
goal by each program tier. Our assessment of programs’ data addressed
whether the data collected by programs could be credibly used to analyze
program effectiveness.

3 COGLIANESE

2008]

2/12/2009 11:51:12 AM

ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS

815

We found that the data collected exhibited reasonable quality, but usually
possessed only limited aggregational and inferential value, and thus are of
limited value in assessing program efficacy. On average, the data collected by
programs scored “medium” on quality: most programs’ structures and designs
provided some but not all potential safeguards for ensuring high-quality data.
What the data sorely lacked, however, was aggregational and inferential value.
Specifically, the data did not share critical features that would allow them to be
added up across all members in a particular program tier and used in empirical
analysis to assess program efficacy appropriately. There were exceptions; data
from some programs or program tiers actually scored “high” or “medium” on
all characteristics. On the whole, however, the data collected by programs in
our sample cannot be credibly be used to assess most programs’ effectiveness.
These general data weaknesses are significant, even surprising, given the
aspirations for ELPs to facilitate policy learning and advocates’ claims that
ELPs are delivering important environmental benefits.104 The reality is that
governments have not been collecting the data needed to be able to determine
whether ELPs are truly making a difference in achieving their goals. The mere
fact that ELP members may have reported reductions in their environmental
footprints does not answer the question of whether ELPs have caused these
reductions. After all, businesses do have other reasons to go beyond
compliance with existing environmental regulations, including the incentive to
try to stave off future regulations.105 Some, if not all, of the environmental
changes documented by ELPs may have occurred for other reasons. As such,
the empirical inquiry we have provided in this Article charts the course for the
kind of data collection and analysis that will be needed to understand whether
ELPs truly cause positive change or are merely symbolic gestures distracting
attention from the search for more meaningful solutions to today’s
environmental problems.

104. See supra notes 19–22, 27 and accompanying text. See also EPA INNOVATION ACTION
COUNCIL, EVERYDAY CHOICES: OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 14 (2005),
available at http://www.epa.gov/NCEI/pdf/rpt2admin.pdf (noting that “EPA has used challenge
programs successfully” including, in Performance Track, ”spurring environmental improvement on a
facility-wide basis”).
105. See REINHARDT, supra note 45, at 11; THOMAS P. LYON & JOHN W. MAXWELL, CORPORATE
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND PUBLIC POLICY 45–46 (2004) (presenting voluntary, beyond-compliance
behavior “as a way to preempt the passage of new government regulations”).
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are interested in submitting a response for our online
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@
boalt.org. Responses to articles may be viewed at our website, http://www.boalt.org/elq.
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APPENDIX I
EPA’S NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE TRACK

Established in 2000, Performance Track is considered one of EPA’s most
prominent and extensive partnership programs. According to agency
documents, the goals of the program are to deliver measurable environmental
results, shift the environmental performance curve, and collaborate more
effectively by “building partnerships, measuring results more systematically,
and creating opportunities for more learning and sharing of information.”
To qualify for membership in Performance Track, a facility must meet
four criteria. It must: (1) have implemented an environmental management
system (EMS), and the EMS must have been independently assessed; (2) have
a record of sustained compliance with environmental laws and regulations; (3)
demonstrate specific past environmental achievements and commit to achieving
measurable environmental results that go beyond compliance; and (4) provide
information to the local community on its environmental activities.
To join Performance Track, a facility must complete an application that
provides information about its size, sector, EMS, past achievements, future
goals, and public outreach and reporting. A key component of the application is
the section in which the facility describes its goals for improving its
environmental performance in the future. Large facilities must establish four
such goals in areas ranging from energy conservation to solid waste reduction,
while small facilities need only establish two. A facility must also complete an
“Environmental Requirements Checklist” indicating the environmental
regulations to which it is subject.
Once admitted, a facility must annually submit to EPA a performance
report that provides detailed information about its progress toward meeting its
commitments. EPA requires that facilities report on their progress in absolute
terms (pounds of pollutant reduced) as well as on a normalized basis (pounds of
pollutant reduced, taking into account changes in production). EPA recognizes
Performance Track members as top performers, presents opportunities to
interact with high-level EPA administrators, limits routine agency inspections,
and offers a package of administrative and regulatory incentives.
EPA posts members’ applications and annual performance reports on its
website. In addition, it annually prepares a report that summarizes members’
contributions to environmental protection. According to a recent agency report,
Performance Track members have collectively reduced the water they use by
about 3.5 billion gallons. They have reduced greenhouse gas emissions by more
than 97,000 tons and increased their use of recycled materials by 135,000 tons.
They have also protected more than 14,000 acres of land.
Membership in Performance Track currently stands at over 500 facilities
from across a variety of industrial sectors and from nonprofit and governmental
organizations.
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APPENDIX II
TABLES OF STATE PROGRAM DATA

Table A-1. Programs in Our Sample
Program
Inception

Number of
Members
(July 2007)

Number of
Tiers or
Membership
Levels

FTEs
Assigned
to
Program*

2000

450

1

19

1998

30

3

1

2004, based
on 1998
program

118

4

6

1998

20

3

2

2000

92

1

1

2000

13

3

0.5

1997

121

1

1.5

2002

4

4

<1

1998

4

3

1

2002

71

3

4.25

2001

0

3

1

1999

3

3

0

1998

30

1

0.4

United States EPA
National Environmental
Performance Track
Colorado
Environmental
Leadership Program
Georgia
Partnership for a
Sustainable Georgia
Idaho
GEMStars
Louisiana
Environmental
Leadership Program
Maine
STEP-UP
Michigan
Clean Corporate Citizen
Missouri
Environmental
Management
Partnership
New Mexico
Green Zia Environmental Excellence
Recognition Program
North Carolina
Environmental
Stewardship Initiative
Oklahoma
Environmental
Performance and
Recognition Program
Oregon
Green Permits Program
South Carolina
Environmental
Excellence Program
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Table A-1, continued.

Tennessee
Pollution Prevention
Partnership
Texas
Clean Texas
Vermont
Business Environmental
Partnership
Virginia
Environmental
Excellence Program

Program
Inception

Number of
Members
(July 2007)

Number of
Tiers or
Membership
Levels

FTEs
Assigned
to
Program*

2000

613

4

4

1998

380

4

3

1998

33

2

1

2000

396

3

2

1995;
11
2
4
relaunched
Green Tier
in 2004
* FTE stands for “full-time equivalent”—essentially the number of full-time employees.
Wisconsin

Table A-2. Program Tiers and Tier Types
Program and Tier or Membership
Level
United States EPA
Colorado
Bronze Achiever
Silver Partner
Gold Leader
Georgia
Champion
Bronze
Silver
Gold
Idaho
Initial Tier
Middle Tier
Highest Tier
Louisiana
Maine
Commitment Track
Leadership Track
Sustainability Track

Tier Type or Category

Number of Members
as of July 2007

Tracking

450

On-Ramp
Middle
Tracking

10
0
20

Advocate
On-Ramp
Middle
Stewardship

32
63
14
9

On-Ramp
Middle
Middle
Middle

20
0
0
92

Middle
Middle/Tracking
Stewardship

1
12
0
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Table A-2, continued.
Program and Tier or Membership
Level
Michigan
Missouri
Partner
Certified Partner
Advanced Partner
Certified Advanced Partner
New Mexico
Commitment Level
Achievement Level
Environmental Excellence Award
North Carolina
Partner
Rising Steward
Steward
Oklahoma
Commitment Level
Achievement Level
Excellence Level
Oregon
Participant
Achiever
Leader
South Carolina
Tennessee
Prospect Level
Pledge Level
Partner Level
Performer Level
Texas
Bronze Member
Silver Member
Gold Member
Platinum Member
Vermont
Environmental Partner
Environmental Leader

Tier Type or Category

Number of Members
as of July 2007

Middle/Tracking

121

Middle
Middle
Tracking
Tracking

0
2
1
0

On-Ramp
Middle
Tracking

4
0
0

On-Ramp
Middle/Tracking
Tracking/ Stewardship

52
13
6

On-Ramp
On-Ramp
Middle

0
0
0

Middle
Tracking
Stewardship
On-Ramp/Middle

0
3
0
30

Advocate
On-Ramp
Middle
Middle/Tracking

418
181
30
2

On-Ramp
Middle
Middle/Tracking
Stewardship

263
0
7
10

Middle
Tracking

31
2
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Table A-2, continued.
Program and Tier or Membership
Level
Virginia
Environmental Enterprise (E2)
Exemplary Environmental
Enterprise (E3)
Extraordinary Environmental
Enterprise (E4)
Wisconsin
Tier 1
Tier 2

Tier Type or Category

Number of Members
as of July 2007

Middle

250

Middle

135

Tracking

11

On-Ramp
Middle

10
1

Table A-3. Program Goals

Direct
Environmental
Benefits

Do Program Goals Include:
Culture
Improvements
Moving the
Change at
in MultiEnvironmental
Facilities
Stakeholder
Performance
and
Relationships
Curve
Agencies
Y(DM)
Y(DM)
Y(DP)
Y (P)
N (D)
Y (P)
Y (M)
Y (M)
Y (D)
N (P)
Y (D), N (P)
N (P)
N (P)
N (P)
N (P)
N (P)
N (P)
N (P)
N (D)
N (D)
Y (P)
Y (DM)
Y (D), N (P)
Y (DP)

Cost
Savings for
Facilities
and
Agencies
Y(P)
Y (P)
Y (D)
Y (M)
Y (M)
N (P)
Y (DP)
Y (DP)

Y(DM)
U.S. EPA
Y (DM)
Colorado
Y (DM)
Georgia
Y (DM)
Idaho
Y (DM)
Louisiana
Y (DM)
Maine
Y (DM)
Michigan
Y (DM)
Missouri
New
Y (DP)
N (DP)
N (DP)
Y (P)
N (DP)
Mexico
Y (D), N
North
Y (D)
Y (DP)
Y (P)
Y (P)
(P)
Carolina
Y (D)
N (D)
N (D)
Y (D)
N (D)
Oklahoma
Y (DM)
Y (P)
Y (P)
Y (P)
N (D)
Oregon
South
Y (DP)
Y (P)
Y (P)
Y (P)
N (P)
Carolina
Y (DM)
Y (M)
Y (P)
Y (P)
Y (P)
Tennessee
Y (DM)
Y (D), N (P)
Y (P)
Y (P)
Y (P)
Texas
Y(DM)
Y(P)
Y(P)
Y(P)
Y(P)
Vermont
Y(DM)
Y(P)
Y(P)
Y(P)
Y(P)
Virginia
Y(DM)
Y(DP)
N(P)
N(P)
Y(DP)
Wisconsin
Key: D indicates information came from descriptive materials. M indicates that a program
manager mentioned the information during the interview without a prompt from us. P
indicates that a program manager mentioned the information during the interview following
a prompt from us.
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Table A-4. Activities Required to Join Programs, by Program and Tier
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
United States
EPA
Colorado
Bronze Achiever
Silver Partner
Gold Leader
Georgia
Champion
Bronze
Silver
Gold
Idaho
Initial Tier
Middle Tier
Highest Tier
Louisiana
Maine
Commitment
Track
Leadership
Track
Sustainability
Track
Michigan
Missouri
Partner
Certified
Partner
Advanced
Partner
Certified
Advanced
Partner

Compliance
with
Regulations

Requirements to Join Program
Environ.
Independent
Performance
EMS
EMS
CommitCertification
ments

Community
Engagement
Commitments

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y
Y

N
N
Y

N
N
Y

N
Y
Y

N
N
N

N
N
Y
Y

N
N
N
Y

N
N
N
Y

N
Y
Y
Y

N
N
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
N

N
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
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Table A-4, continued.
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
New Mexico
Commitment
Level
Achievement
Level
Environmental
Excellence
Award
North Carolina
Partner
Rising Steward
Steward
Oklahoma
Commitment
Level
Achievement
Level
Excellence
Level
Oregon
Participant
Achiever
Leader
South Carolina
Tennessee
Prospect Level
Pledge Level
Partner Level
Performer Level
Texas
Bronze Member
Silver Member
Gold Member
Platinum
Member

Compliance
with
Regulations

Requirements to Join Program
Environ.
Independent
Performance
EMS
EMS
CommitCertification
ments

Community
Engagement
Commitments

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

N

N

N

Y

Y

N

N

Y

Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y

N
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

N
N
Y

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
Y
Y

N
N
N
Y

N
N
N
N

N
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
Y

Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y

N
Y
Y

Y
N
Y

Y
N
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
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Table A-4, continued.
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
Vermont
Environmental
Partner
Environmental
Leader
Virginia
Environmental
Enterprise (E2)
Exemplary
Environmental
Enterprise (E3)
Extraordinary
Environmental
Enterprise (E4)
Wisconsin
Tier 1
Tier 2

Compliance
with
Regulations

Requirements to Join Program
Environ.
Independent
Performance
EMS
EMS
CommitCertification
ments

Community
Engagement
Commitments

N

N

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

N
Y

Y
Y

N
Y

Table A-5. Activities Required to Remain in Programs, by Program and
Tier
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
United States
EPA
Colorado
Bronze
Achiever
Silver Partner
Gold Leader
Georgia
Champion
Bronze
Silver
Gold

Requirements to Maintain Membership in Program
Progress
Maintain
Toward
Compliance
or
Performance
Community
with
Achieving
Develop
Reporting
Engagement
CommitRegulations
EMS
ments
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

n/a

N

N

n/a

N

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

N
N

N
Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y

N
N
N
N

N
N
Y
Y
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Table A-5, continued.

Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
Idaho
Initial Tier
Middle Tier
Highest Tier
Louisiana
Maine
Commitment
Track
Leadership
Track
Sustainability
Track
Michigan
Missouri
Partner
Certified
Partner
Advanced
Partner
Certified
Advanced
Partner
New Mexico
Commitment
Level
Achievement
Level
Environmental
Excellence
Award
North
Carolina
Partner
Rising Steward
Steward

Requirements to Maintain Membership in Program
Progress
Maintain
Toward
Compliance
or
Performance
Community
Achieving
with
Develop
Reporting
Engagement
CommitRegulations
EMS
ments
N
N
N
Y

N
N
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y

N/A
N/A
N/A
N

N
N
N
N

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N*

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Not Applicable. Facilities Apply Each Year.

N
N
N

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

N
Y
Y

N
N
Y
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Table A-5, continued.

Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
Oklahoma
Commitment
Level
Achievement
Level
Excellence
Level
Oregon
Participant
Achiever
Leader
South
Carolina
Tennessee
Prospect Level
Pledge Level
Partner Level
Performer
Level
Texas
Bronze
Member
Silver Member
Gold Member
Platinum
Member
Vermont
Environmental
Partner
Environmental
Leader

Requirements to Maintain Membership in Program
Progress
Maintain
Compliance
Toward
or
Performance
Community
Achieving
with
Develop
Reporting
Engagement
Regulations
CommitEMS
ments

Information Not Available.

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y

N
N
N

Y
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N
N
Y

N
N
N

N
N
Y

N
N
N*

N
N
N

Y

Y

Y

N*

Y

Y

N

Y

N

Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

Y
Y

N
N

N
Y

Y

Y

Y

N

Y

N

N

Y

N

N

Y

Y

Y

N

N
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Table A-5, continued.
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level

Requirements to Maintain Membership in Program
Maintain
Progress
Compliance
Performance
Community
or
Toward
with
Develop
Reporting
Achieving
Engagement
Regulations
EMS
Commitments

Virginia
Environ.
Enterprise
Y
Y
Y
N
N
(E2)
Exemplary
Environ.
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Enterprise
(E3)
Extraordinary
Environ.
Y
Y
Y
N
Y
Enterprise
(E4)
Wisconsin
Tier 1
Y
Y
Y
N
N
Tier 2
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
* In each of these cases, we received conflicting information from different sources. In Table
7, we counted each of these as one-half “yes” and one-half “no.”

Table A-6. Program Activities
Does the Program Offer:
Opportunities to Interact
with Representatives of
Incentives to
Government, Other
Mentoring
Members
Firms, and the
Community
United
States EPA
Colorado
Georgia
Idaho
Louisiana
Maine
Michigan
Missouri
New
Mexico
North
Carolina
Oklahoma
Oregon

Information
Sharing

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
N
Y
N
N

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

N
N

N
N

Y
Y

Y
N
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Table A-6, continued.
Does the Program Offer:
Opportunities to Interact
with Representatives of
Government, Other
Firms, and the
Community

Mentoring

Incentives to
Members

Information
Sharing

South
Y
Y
Y
Y
Carolina
Y
Y
Y
Y
Tennessee
N*
N*
Y
Y
Texas
Y
Y
Y
Y
Vermont
Y
N
Y
Y
Virginia
Y
N
Y
Y
Wisconsin
* In each of these cases, we received conflicting information from different sources. In
Figure 2, we counted each of these as one-half “yes” and one-half “no.”

Table A-7. Program Communication Strategies
Does the Program Communicate its Results Thorough:
Annual Reports
About the
Program Posted
on Website

Information on
Individual
Members Posted
on Website

Public
Meetings

Press
Releases

United States
Y
Y
Y
Y
EPA
N
Y
N
Y
Colorado
Georgia
N
Y
Y
Y
Idaho
N
Y
N
Y
Louisiana
Y*
Y*
N
Y
Maine
N
N
N
Y
Michigan
Y
Y
N
N
Missouri
N
Y
N
N
New Mexico
Y
Y
N
Y
North Carolina
Y
Y
Y
Y
Oklahoma
N
N
N
N
Oregon
N
Y
N
N
South Carolina
N
N
Y
Y
Tennessee
N
Y
Y
Y
Texas
N
N
Y
Y
Vermont
N
N
Y
Y
Virginia
Y
N
Y
Y
Wisconsin
Y
Y
Y
Y
* In each of these cases, we received conflicting information from different sources. In
Figure 3, we counted each of these as one-half "yes" and one-half "no."
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Table A-8. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of
"Direct Environmental Benefits"
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
United States
EPA
Colorado
Bronze Achiever
Silver Partner
Gold Leader
Georgia
Champion
Bronze
Silver
Gold
Idaho
Initial Tier
Middle Tier
Highest Tier
Louisiana
Maine
Commitment
Track
Leadership
Track
Sustainability
Track
Michigan
Missouri
Partner
Certified
Partner
Advanced
Partner
Certified
Advanced
Partner

Goal: Direct Environmental Benefits
Data
Relevance

Data
Quality

Aggregational
Value

Inferential
Value

Data
Accessibility

H

H

H

M

H

H
H
H

L
M
H

L
L
H

L
L
M

L
L
L

n/a
H
H
H

n/a
M
M
H

n/a
M
H
H

n/a
L
M
M

n/a
H
H
H

H
H
H
H

M
M
M
L

L
L
L
L

L
L
L
L

M
M
M
L

H

M

M

M

L

H

M

M

M

L

H

M

M

M

L

H

M

L

M

M

H

H

M

M

M

H

H

M

M

M

H

H

M

M

M

H

H

M

M

M
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Table A-8, continued.
Program and Tier
or Membership
Level
New Mexico
Commitment
Level
Achievement
Level
Environmental
Excellence
Award
North Carolina
Partner
Rising Steward
Steward
Oklahoma
Commitment
Level
Achievement
Level
Excellence Level
Oregon
Participant
Achiever
Leader
South Carolina
Tennessee
Prospect Level
Pledge Level
Partner Level
Performer Level
Texas
Bronze Member
Silver Member
Gold Member
Platinum
Member

Goal: Direct Environmental Benefits
Data
Relevance

Data
Quality

Aggregational
Value

Inferential
Value

Data
Accessibility

H

L

L

L

M

H

M

L

M

M

H

M

L

M

M

H
H
H

M
H
H

H
H
H

M
M
M

M
M
M

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

H
H
H
H

H
H
H
M

L
L
L
L

M
M
M
L

H
H
H
L

n/a
H
H
H

n/a
L
M
H

n/a
L
L
L

n/a
L
L
L

n/a
L
M
H

H
H
H

M
H
H

H
H
H

M
M
M

L
L
L

H

H

H

M

L
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Table A-8, continued.
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level

Goal: Direct Environmental Benefits
Data
Relevance

Data
Quality

Aggregational
Value

Inferential
Value

Data
Accessibility

Vermont
Environmental
H
M
M
L
L
Partner
Environmental
H
H
M
L
L
Leader
Virginia
Environmental
H
M
H
M
L
Enterprise (E2)
Exemplary
H
H
H
M
L
Environmental
Enterprise (E3)
Extraordinary
H
H
H
M
L
Environmental
Enterprise (E4)
Wisconsin
Tier 1
H
M
L
L
H
Tier 2
H
H
L
L
H
Key: “H” indicates “high,” our top score in a category. “M” indicates “medium.” “L”
indicates “low,” our bottom score in a category. “n/a” indicates not applicable.

Table A-9. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of
"Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships"
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
United States
EPA
Colorado
Bronze Achiever
Silver Partner
Gold Leader
Georgia
Champion
Bronze
Silver
Gold

Goal: Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships
Data
Relevance

Data
Quality

Aggregational
Value

Inferential
Value

Data
Accessibility

M

M

L

L

H

n/a
n/a
M

n/a
n/a
M

n/a
n/a
L

n/a
n/a
L

n/a
n/a
L

M
n/a
M
M

M
n/a
H
H

M
n/a
M
M

L
n/a
L
L

H
n/a
H
H
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Table A-9, continued.
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
Idaho
Initial Tier
Middle Tier
Highest Tier
Louisiana
Maine
Commitment
Track
Leadership
Track
Sustainability
Track
Michigan
Missouri
Partner
Certified
Partner
Advanced
Partner
Certified
Advanced
Partner
New Mexico
Commitment
Level
Achievement
Level
Environmental
Excellence
Award
North Carolina
Partner
Rising Steward
Steward

Goal: Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships
Data
Relevance

Data
Quality

Aggregational
Value

Inferential
Value

Data
Accessibility

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

M

L

L

L

L

M

L

L

L

L

M

L

L

L

L

M

n/a
n/a
L

n/a
n/a
M

n/a
n/a
M

n/a
n/a
L

n/a
n/a
M
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Table A-9, continued.
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
Oklahoma
Commitment
Level
Achievement
Level
Excellence Level
Oregon
Participant
Achiever
Leader
South Carolina
Tennessee
Prospect Level
Pledge Level
Partner Level
Performer Level
Texas
Bronze Member
Silver Member
Gold Member
Platinum
Member
Vermont
Environmental
Partner
Environmental
Leader
Virginia
Environmental
Enterprise (E2)

Goal: Improvements in Multi-Stakeholder Relationships
Data
Relevance

Data
Quality

Aggregational
Value

Inferential
Value

Data
Accessibility

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

M
M
M
M

H
H
H
M

L
L
L
L

L
L
L
L

H
H
H
L

n/a
n/a
n/a
M

n/a
n/a
n/a
H

n/a
n/a
n/a
L

n/a
n/a
n/a
L

n/a
n/a
n/a
M

M
n/a
M

M
n/a
H

M
n/a
M

L
n/a
L

L
n/a
L

M

H

M

L

L

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

M

L

L

L

L

Exemplary
Environmental
Enterprise (E3)

M

M

L

L

L

Extraordinary
Environmental
Enterprise (E4)

M

M

L

L

L

Wisconsin
Tier 1
M
L
L
L
H
Tier 2
M
L
L
L
H
Key: “H” indicates “high,” our top score in a category. “M” indicates “medium.” “L”
indicates “low,” our bottom score in a category. “n/a” indicates not applicable.
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Table A-10. Characteristics of Data Collected in Support of the Goal of
"Cost Savings for Facilities and Agencies"
Program and
Tier or
Membership
Level
United States
EPA
Colorado
Bronze Achiever
Silver Partner
Gold Leader
Georgia
Champion
Bronze
Silver
Gold
Idaho
Initial Tier
Middle Tier
Highest Tier
Louisiana
Maine
Commitment
Track
Leadership
Track
Sustainability
Track
Michigan
Missouri
Partner
Certified
Partner
Advanced
Partner
Certified
Advanced
Partner
New Mexico
Commitment
Level
Achievement
Level
Environmental
Excellence
Award

Goal: Cost Savings for Facilities and Agencies
Data
Relevance

Data
Quality

Aggregational
Value

Inferential
Value

Data
Accessibility

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
n/a

n/a
n/a
H

n/a
n/a
L

n/a
n/a
M

n/a
n/a
L

n/a
n/a
H

H
H
H
H

M
M
M
L

M
M
M
M

L
L
L
L

M
M
M
L

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

H

M

M

L

L

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

n/a

H

M

M

L

M

H

M

M

L

M
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Table A-10, continued.
Program and
Goal: Cost Savings for Facilities and Agencies
Tier or
Data
Data
Aggregational Inferential
Data
Membership
Relevance
Quality
Value
Value
Accessibility
Level
N. Carolina
Partner
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Rising Steward
H
H
M
L
L
Steward
H
H
M
L
L
Oklahoma
Commitment
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Level
Achievement
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Level
Excellence Level
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Oregon
Participant
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Achiever
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Leader
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
S. Carolina
Tennessee
Prospect Level
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Pledge Level
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Partner Level
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
Performer Level
H
L
M
L
M
Texas
Bronze Member
H
L
M
M
L
Silver Member
H
L
M
M
L
Gold Member
H
L
M
M
L
Platinum
H
L
M
M
L
Member
Vermont
Environmental
H
L
M
L
L
Partner
Environmental
H
L
M
L
L
Leader
Virginia
Environmental
H
L
M
L
L
Enterprise (E2)
Exemplary
H
L
M
L
L
Environmental
Enterprise (E3)
Extraordinary
Environmental
H
L
M
L
L
Enterprise (E4)
Wisconsin
Tier 1
H
L
M
L
H
Tier 2
H
L
M
L
H
Key: “H” indicates “high,” our top score in a category. “M” indicates “medium.” “L”
indicates “low,” our bottom score in a category. “n/a” indicates not applicable.

